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This dissertation study investigates the impact of the US biofuel policies related to
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission regulation, tax credit and renewable fuel standard
(RFS2) mandate over production and consumption of ethanol as well as technical and
environmental performance of corn ethanol plants. The study develops analytical models
and provides quantitative estimation of the impact of various biofuel policies in each of
the three chapters.
Chapter 1 of this dissertation examines the tradeoff between achieving the
environmental goal of minimizing life cycle GHG emissions and minimizing production
costs in recently built dry-grind corn ethanol plants. The results indicate that the average
ethanol plant is able to reduce GHG emissions by 36 % relative to the level under cost
minimization, but production costs are 22 % higher. To move from least cost to least
emissions allocations, ethanol plants would on average produce 25 % more of wet
byproduct and 47% less of dry byproduct.
Using a multi-output, multi-input partial equilibrium model, Chapter 2 explores
the impact of the tax credit and RFS2 mandate policy on market price of ethanol,
byproducts, corn, and other factor inputs employed in the production of corn ethanol. In
the short-run, without tax credit ethanol plants will not have the incentive to produce the

minimum level of ethanol required by RFS2. In the long-run, if ethanol plants to have the
incentive to produce the minimum RFS2 mandate without tax credit policy, gasoline
price will need to increase by order of 50% or more relative to the 2011 price.
Chapter 3 develop meta-regression model to investigate the extent to which
statistical heterogeneity among results of multiple studies on soil organic carbon (SOC)
sequestration rates can be related to one or more characteristics of the studies in response
to conventional tillage (CT) and no-till (NT). Regarding the difference in the rate of SOC
sequestration between NT and CT, our results shows that the percentage of heterogeneity
in the true treatment effect that is attributable to between-study variability is 49%,
whereas 51 % is attributable to within-study sampling variability.
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Chapter 1: The Shadow Price of GHG Reduction in Corn
Ethanol Plants
Abstract
This article examines the cost of reducing CO2 emissions in a sample of recently built
dry-grind corn ethanol plants. The analysis estimates a translog minimum value function
that represents both the minimum cost and the minimum CO2 emissions for given levels
of ethanol production. The results indicate that the average plant is able to reduce GHG
emissions by 36 percent relative to the level under cost minimization, but production
costs are 22 percent higher. The reallocations by which these emissions reductions are
achieved are primarily the substitution of wet for dry distillers grains, with the
corresponding reduction in the use of natural gas and electricity. To move from least cost
to least emissions allocations, ethanol plants would on average produce 25 % more of wet
byproduct and 47% less of dry byproduct. Comparing results across observations, the
estimated shadow cost of emission abatement ranges from $86 to $190 per ton of CO2,
with average value of $124 per ton. This implied shadow cost of abatement can be used
as a bench mark for pollution trading and serves to assess the potential response to
biofeul regulations.
Key words: GHG abatement, shadow price of abatement, corn ethanol
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1.1 Introduction
A common approach to measuring environmental efficiency when desirable and
undesirable outputs are produced jointly is to treat the undesirable output as another
variable into the production model, either as another input or as a weakly disposable bad
output1. Such analysis is frequently based on a primal representation of the technology
using input- and output-oriented distance functions.
In this article we followed different route to measure the environmental efficiency of
an industry based on a minimum value function estimated from data obtained from a
sample of corn ethanol plants in the Midwest US. CO2 emissions in ethanol plants are
not directly measured, but are estimated from inputs used and outputs produced. Because
CO2 emissions are a linear function of outputs and inputs, the minimum value function
for emissions has the same algebraic structure and parameters as the minimum value
function for net cost, defined here as the cost of inputs minus the revenue from
byproducts. In the case of emissions, emissions coefficients for the inputs and outputs
are substituted for the prices of outputs and inputs. Given observations on firm behavior,
it is possible to estimate the minimum cost function, which then also provides an estimate
of the minimum GHG function. Our article exploits the relationship between the linearity
of the materials balance equation and that of the minimum cost function to allow us to
calculate the cost forgone to achieve the maximum decrease in GHG emissions.

1

Strong disposability implies that it is free of charge to dispose of unwanted inputs or
outputs, weak disposability implies expensive disposal.
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Empirically, we estimate the minimum value function with a translog specification, using
plant-level data from a sample of recently constructed ethanol plants in the Midwest.
The earliest study to incorporate undesirable outputs in efficiency measurement was
Pittman (1983) who developed an adjusted Tornqvist productivity index in which
environmental effects are treated as additional undesirable outputs whose disposability is
costly. Färe et al. (1989) used Pittman’s data to evaluate environmental performance of
US fossil fuel-fired electric utilities using a nonparametric hyperbolic distance function.
Extending this, Färe et al. (1993) used a parametric mathematical programming technique
based on translog output distance function to calculate an enhanced hyperbolic efficiency
measure. Several empirical applications and extensions followed these seminal works.
Later a directional distance function was developed that treats desirable and undesirable
outputs asymmetrically (Chambers, Chung, and Färe 1996; Chung, Färe, and Grosskopf
1997; Färe et al. 2005; Ball et al. 2004; Cuesta, Lovell, and Zofio 2009). These
directional output or input distance functions were estimated either using deterministic
(parametric or nonparametric) or stochastic (exclusively parametric) techniques, but they
do not consider pollution abatement based on emission content of the inputs and outputs
considered in the production process.
One of the advantages of our modeling approach is allowing an industry to choose
optimal combination inputs and byproducts that minimize bad output based on the
materials flow coefficients of a particular input, instead of using market price
information. In addition, this technique does not need an extra pollution variable in the
production process. Our approach shares some methodological similarity with recent
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measures of environmental efficiency based on the material balance concept (Coelli,
Lauwers, and Van Huylenbroeck 2007; Welch and Barnum 2010; Lauwers 2009;
Sesmero, Perrin, and Fulginiti 2010). However these studies were implemented with data
envelopment analysis (DEA), a technique which is not able to accommodate
measurement errors in input and output without bootstrapping.
The objective of this article specifically is to examine the potential for corn ethanol
plants to reduce GHG emissions by reallocation among inputs and byproducts, and the
cost of such reductions. The tradeoff between these two goals describes the opportunity
cost of reducing CO2 emissions - two points on the supply curve for emissions
reductions. The results of our model provide valuable information to the ethanol industry
in its efforts to reduce emissions to comply with current and potential regulations. The
2007 US Energy Independent and Security Act (EISA) required 20 to 60 percent life
cycle GHG emissions reductions relative to gasoline for biofuels to qualify in meeting
mandated levels of renewable fuels. The legislation requires a reduction of 20 percent for
new corn-ethanol plants, 50 percent for other advanced biofuels and 60 percent for
cellulosic ethanol. The low carbon fuel standard (LCFS) of California also requires a 10
percent reduction in the carbon content of California’s transportation fuels by 2020. The
above regulations require that the GHG from corn ethanol have to be assessed on a full
life cycle basis including emissions from energy consumed at the ethanol plants, which
we examine here.
In the next section, we develop the theoretical and analytical techniques to examine
the efficiency measure of the ethanol plant. The fundamental theory is based on the
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minimum value function for cost and GHG. In section 3, we present data and the
econometric estimation procedure. The empirical results of our application and
implication of this article are elucidated in section 4. Summary and concluding remarks
are then provided in section 5.

1.2 Theoretical Model
Net ethanol cost is defined here as the cost of three inputs minus the revenues from
the two by products. The minimum cost function allows us, using Shephard's lemma, to
obtain the optimal level of inputs given quantities of ethanol produced (e), input prices
facing the firm (W), byproduct prices facing the firm (P), and the level of fixed inputs
(Z). The mimimum plant-level net ethanol cost function we therefore define as:

C N (e,W , P, Z )  min{WX  PY | (e, X , Y , Z )  T }

(1)

x, y

where : e is ethanol output measured in gallons; X is a vector of inputs of corn in bushels,
natural gas in MBTU, electricity in KWH; and Y is a vector of ethanol byproducts, dry
distillers grain (DDG) in tons of dry matter and modified wet distillers grain (WDG) in
tons of dry matter. W and P are vectors of strictly positive prices for factor inputs and
byproduct respectively, Z is the quantity of other fixed inputs (in $). W and P are
exogenous to ethanol producers. T is the firm's production possibilities set and is
assumed to be a nonempty, compact, and convex set. Under the assumptions made on T,
C N (e,W , P, Z )

is assumed to be twice-continuously differentiable, homogenous of degree
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one in variable input and byproduct prices and in fixed input quantities, concave in
prices, and convex in quantities (Diewert 1971; Diewert & Wales 1987).
By applying Shephard’s lemma, the n vector of constant output factor demand and
byproduct supply functions are derived from the specified cost function by simply
differentiating with respect to input prices and by product prices, respectively.
C N
C N
c
 X i (e,W , P, Z ) and
 Yic (e,W , P, Z )
Pi
Wi

(2)

The above conditional factor and by product functions are homogenous of degree zero in
factor and by product prices respectively.
Given the way CO2 emissions are calculated by regulators, there is a linear
relationship between emissions and observable input use and output. Specifically, CO2
emissions are linearly related to the quantity of ethanol and two byproducts produced.
We can therefore define the minimum achievable GHG emissions, for a given level of
ethanol output, as
GHG M (e, a, b, Z )  min {aX  bY | (e, X , Y , Z )  T }

(3)

x, y

Where a and b are the vectors of GHG emission coefficients per unit of factor input
X and by products Y, respectively. It is obvious that this minimum function is the same
as the cost minimum function in (1) above, but with GHG coefficients substituted for
prices as arguments of the function. Estimation of the minimum cost function then
provides an estimate of the minimum GHG function. Again invoking Shephard's lemma,
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evaluating the derivatives of the GHG M function at emissions coefficients yields GHG
minimizing allocation of inputs and byproduct respectively:
GHGM
GHGM
 X i g (e, (a,b), Z ) and
 Yi g (e, (a,b), Z )
ai
bi

(4)

GHGM is achieved by allowing the firm to choose optimum combination of inputs
and byproduct sets that minimize GHG. The emission coefficients a and b reinforce the
explicit link between production technology and environmental outcomes. This technical
approach is perceived as a material-balance principle which is the tenet of the law on the
conservation of matter/energy. This law is an essential biophysical condition stating that
the flow of materials taken from the environment for economic activities generates a flow
of materials from the economy back into the environment that is of equal weight.
Theoretical and methodological approach of environmental efficiency measures based on
the material-balance principle is extensively discussed by (Coelli, Lauwers and Van
Huylenbroeck 2007; Lauwers 2009; Welch and Barnum 2009).
We illustrate graphically on Figure 1, the correspondence between the GHG and cost
minimization outcome for unit isoquant for the case of two inputs. The isoquant
represents a gallon of ethanol produced, the X and Y-axis represent the BTU and KWH
input of natural gas and electricity respectively. Point C on the unit isoquant represents a
cost minimizing point, the tangent line at that point represents the iso-cost line, and the
line crossing point C represents the all combinations of inputs with GHG emissions equal
to those at point C. Likewise we can identify the allocation that results in the plant’s
minimum GHG emissions, point G, and the isocost line associated with that allocation.
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Elect, KWH

Iso GHG line with cost minimizing objective

G
Iso cost line with GHG minimizing objective

C
Iso GHG line with GHG minimizing
objective

Iso cost line with cost minimizing objective

N.gas, BTU

Figure 1.1 The correspondence between cost and GHG minimization outcome for unit
isoquant
Equations 5 and 6 represent the isocost and iso GHG lines that pass through point C.
Both are calculated using cost minimizing allocation of the three inputs and two
byproducts.

C C (e, w, p, Z )  WX C  PY C

(5)

GHGC  aX C  bY C

(6)

Equation 7 and 8 are computed using the GHG minimizing optimal allocation of inputs
and byproducts. These equations represent the iso cost and iso GHG line that pass
through point G.

C g  WX g  PY g

(7)

GHG g (e, a,b, Z )  aX g  bY g

(8)
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The iso-GHG line that passes through point C identifies a greater quantity than the
corresponding line that pass through point G which indicates that producing at cost
minimizing goal would lead plant to produce more GHG than a plant that produces at
point G.
The minimum function above can help us to identify Discrete Shadow price (DSP)
per gallon of ethanol and Discrete Abatement (DA) of GHG emissions reduction per
gallon of ethanol respectively

DSP 

DA 

C g  CC
; ($ / gal )
e

GHGC  GHGM
; (ton / gal )
e

(9)

(10)

The ratio of equation 9 over 10 provides an estimate of the discrete cost per ton of GHG
abatement or shadow price of emissions.
Efficiency is measured at some particular allocation point. Each plant has efficiency
measurements, measured either at their actual allocation, at their minimum cost
allocation, or at their minimum GHG allocation. In this article we measure Cost
Efficiency (CE) as the ratio of minimum cost over the cost when plants were producing at
GHG minimizing point. Likewise Environmental Efficiency (EE) is measured as the
ratio of minimum achievable CO2 at GHG minimizing point over GHG at the cost
minimizing point. If EE is <1 a particular firm is not environmentally efficient since the
cost minimizing firm is not minimizing the level of emission in the production process. If
EE is ≥1 a particular plant is environmentally efficient.
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The above arguments allow us to evaluate whether the particular plant is economically
and environmentally efficient using our estimated cost and GHG function. A plant is
environmentally efficient when it chooses the minimum CO2 per gallon of ethanol. But
the plant will not likely be cost efficient when it is environmentally efficient. Obviously
based on figure 1, moving along the isoquant from point C to G results in an increase in
environmental efficiency, but decrease in cost efficiency.
Empirically, we estimate the minimum value function with a translog specification
for 3 inputs and 2 byproducts represented in equation 11 using the translog cost
(Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau 1971, 1973).

ln V   o   R  0.5RR

(11)

Where  o is an intercept,   1X7 first order coefficient parameters and  is 7X7 second
order coefficient parameters. Where R is natural log of {w, p, e, z} .
The derivative of the translog cost with respect to input and byproduct prices yields the
cost share of input and byproducts, S:

 ln V
|r  ( w, p)  s(e, ( w, P), z )     R
 ln r

(12)

Where r  {w, p}
We also calculate the Allen partial price elasticities of inputs and byproducts
based on the translog cost function. The elasticity estimates are calculated at the mean of
the prices, and input and byproduct cost share. The appendix section presents the
mathematical derivation for the above elasticities.
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1.3 The Data and Estimation Procedure
The article uses data obtained from a survey of seven dry-grind ethanol plants from
North-central Midwest states (Perrin, Fretes, and Sesmero 2009). The observations are
quarterly based operating data during 2006 to 2007. The period surveyed began in the
third quarter of 2006 and lasted until the fourth quarter of 2007 (not all plants were
observed in all quarters) yielding 34 quarterly observations with a minimum of 3 and
maximum of 7 quarters of observation per plant. The seven plants produced an average of
53.1 million gallons of denatured ethanol per year, with a range from 42.5 to 88.1 million
gallons per year. For this article we calculated actual GHG emissions for each
observation using emission coefficients obtained from the Biofuel Energy Systems
Simulator (BESS; www.bess.unl.edu) model that was developed to compare life cycle
GHG emissions from ethanol production relative to gasoline as a motor fuel, while
accounting for the dynamic interactions of corn production, ethanol-plant operation, and
byproduct feeding to livestock (Liska et al. 2009). Byproducts from ethanol plants are
given a credit for replacing corn as feed in livestock production2.
The econometric procedure of we followed is joint estimation of the cost function and
the cost share equations using the Zellner's Iterative Seemingly Unrelated Regression

2

All GHG emissions from the burning of fossil fuels used directly in crop production,
grain transportation, biorefinery energy use, and byproduct transport are included in the
BESS model. All upstream GHG emissions with production of fossil fuels, fertilizer
inputs, and electricity used in the production life cycle are also included (Liska et.al
2009).
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(ITSUR) approach. Homogeneity and symmetry restriction were maintained3. We
stacked the GHG and cost function together while estimating econometrically. After
symmetry and homegenity restrictions, with three inputs, two byproducts, one output and
a fixed variable we have 36 parameters to be estimated. In the short run, given the
installed technologies, we assumed that there is no substitution possibility of corn for
natural gas and electricity. We further assumed own price, output constant demand
elasticity for corn is zero. These assumptions leave us to estimate a total of 33
parameters.

3

Symmetry and equality restrictions imposed across equations to ensure uniqueness of
estimated parameters which occur in more than one equation.
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1.4 Empirical Results and Discussion
Table 1.1 displays the mean value of observed data per quarter used for our translog
estimation. Table 1.2 presents the parameter estimates of equation 11. These parameter
estimates were used to compute the minimum achievable cost and GHG, optimal level of
input and byproducts as well as the shadow price for each plant. The regularity
properties of the cost function4(monotonicity and curvature) were maintained. Table 1.3
contains the level and percent change input and byproducts per gallon of ethanol under
cost and GHG minimizing objective respectively. Whereas table 1.4 provides the change
in the level of GHG as a result of input and byproduct adjustment made when a plant
producing at GHG compared to cost minimizing point. The estimated minimum level of
GHG and cost per gallon of ethanol at GHG and cost minimizing point is also reported in
table 1.4. The shadow value of GHG and the cost and environmental efficiency measures
are presented on table 1.5 through 1.7 respectively. Table 1.8 shows the Allen partial
price elasticity of inputs and byproducts evaluated at mean of each predicted share.
At the cost minimization point, (table 1.3), the average optimal input quantities of
natural gas, electricity and corn feed stock per gallon of ethanol were 0.05 BTU, 1.71
KWH and 0.29 bushel respectively. The average optimal DDG and WDG output levels
were 4.9 and 1.8 lb per gallon of ethanol. The corresponding results of the GHG
minimizing objective for each input and byproducts were depicted on table 1.3.

4

All estimated shares were monotonic everywhere except eleven data points whereas the
curvature properties satisfied at each data observation.

14

The average optimum allocation at GHG minimization point was to produce 47%
less of dry and 25% more of wet byproduct, with a reduction of natural gas and electricity
use by 77% and 65 % respectively, albeit corn feedstock use rose 47%. Moving from
cost to GHG minimizing point, the average fraction of dried byproduct (the ratio of DDG
to the total byproduct produced) falls from 0.78 to 0.58 whilst the extra natural gas used
to dry byproduct fall from 0.0513 to 0.018 MBTU/gal. Perrin, Fretes, and Sesmero
(2009) estimated an additional 0.00933MMBTU/gal natural gas needed to dry an
additional one ton of byproduct, dry matter basis, from 55% moisture (MWDGS) to 10%
moisture (DDGS.) It is evident that ethanol-plant energy use and associated GHG
emissions are affected by fraction of total byproduct dried.
The average GHG per gallon of ethanol measured across all observations at cost
minimizing allocations was 10.2 lb whereas at GHG minimizing point was 6.7 lb, (table
1.4). This suggests that moving from cost to GHG minimizing goal, on average the plant
potentially reduced 3.52 lb GHG per gallon of ethanol as portrayed in table 1.4. The
average costs at these two allocations from the sample were approximately $1.01/gal and
$1.24/gal respectively (table 1.4).
The average shadow prices per quarter ranges from $86 to $190 per ton with average
value of $124, (table 1.5). We also found the shadow price as small as $27 and $34 per
ton for two plans in one quarter which is an indication of the potential room to abate
GHG emissions with least cost for given level of ethanol. Using the same data but with a
non-parametric approach, Sesmero, Perrin , and Fulginiti (2010) on average found
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$1,726 per ton as the shadow costs associated with moving from GHG minimizing to the
returns over operating costs maximizing allocations.
The price of the variable inputs and byproducts considered in this study has changed
substantially compared to the surveyed year as shown on table 1.1, so also does any given
estimate of average shadow price. To capture this change, we ran sensitivity analysis to
see how the average shadow price changes with updated prices by evaluating at different
inputs and byproducts price using the parameters shown on table 1.2. When evaluating at
the mean price of the 2006/07 survey data, the mean shadow price was $119 per ton,
(table 1.7). However when we updated only the price of corn to the year 2012 value, the
shadow price increased to $161 per ton. This price fell to $103 when we updated only the
price of natural gas. We should note here that the price of corn is doubled whereas the
price of natural gas fall by nearly 20 percent compared to the price during the 2006/07
survey. When we further updated both the price of corn and natural gas at the same time,
we found $167 per ton. The mean shadow prices reached $173 per ton when we
evaluated after updating all input and byproduct prices. Note that the emission
coefficients of all inputs and byproducts have not changed from what it was at the
surveyed year.
Measured across plants the average environmental efficiency (EE) score is 0.64,
showing that on average ethanol plant would be able to produce their current ethanol
output with an input bundle and byproduct combination that contains 36 % less of GHG.
To do so, on average the total cost of ethanol production would rise by 22 percent. As
shown on Table 1.6, to cut emissions, for example by nearly 30 percent, some plants
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would raise their cost by 25% albeit for the same level of emission reduction some would
raise the cost as low as 13%. Our results also indicated some plants could potentially cut
their emission level by as much as 50%. When we updated all prices of inputs and
byproducts to the year 2012 values, on average plans could reduce emissions by 57
percent while to do so the cost of ethanol production would rise by 46 percent as depicted
on Table 1.7.
Whether distillers grains are dried or sold wet is the key factor that determines the
ability of a corn ethanol plant to reduce GHG emission since eliminating the need for
drying of DDGS for corn-ethanol plants can have a significant positive effect on the level
of natural gas use.
We present the Allen partial price elasticities calculated from the translog cost
function in table 1.8. The diagonal or own price elasticities for all inputs and by
products are negative which indicates curvature properties actually hold for the price
estimation. Own price elasticities for natural gas and electricity were inelastic but the
cross price elasticities of natural gas and electricity revealed complementarity as opposed
to substitution between them. However, the two byproducts showed substitution in the
production process which we anticipated given the nature of byproducts production
process.
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1.5 Conclusion and Policy Implication
This study develops an analytical framework to explore the tradeoff between
environmental efficiency and cost efficiency among corn ethanol plants. The model and
estimation techniques presented are applicable to a broad range of industries. The study
also shows a departure from the conventional techniques that treat the undesirable output
as another variable into the production model.
Our result indicates that the average plant is able to reduce GHG emissions by 36
percent relative to the level under cost minimization, but that production costs will be
then 22 percent higher than the minimum possible. The reallocations responsible for
these emissions reductions are primarily the substitution of wet for dry distillers grains,
with the corresponding reduction in the use of natural gas and electricity. Our findings
revealed that on average ethanol plants would produce 25 % more of wet byproduct and
47% less of dry byproduct.
Comparing results across observations, the estimated shadow price for emissions
reduction ranges from $86 to $190 per ton of CO2 with average value of $124 per ton.
The study also found that there was considerable heterogeneity among the corn ethanol
plants in the level of emissions reduction and abatement cost per gallon of ethanol. The
variation of GHG reductions and abatement costs per gallon of ethanol across plant
results from different in relative prices and variations in plant configurations even though
all plants were constructed at approximately the same time and share the same basic
technology, whilst the heterogeneity reflects the presence of potential room for the plant
improvement in reducing GHG.
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When abatement programs based on market incentives exist, as is proposed by
California’s LCFS, the implied shadow price of GHG can be used as a bench mark for
pollution trading and serves to assess the effectiveness of existing regulation. Imposing a
new regulatory requirement over biofuel would likely cause a shift in ethanol markets
that favors plants that mitigate GHG.
With regard to corn ethanol plants our findings would provide valuable information to
the industry in its efforts to comply with upcoming regulations, and to policy makers who
must consider the CO2 abatement costs of the corn ethanol system. The analysis
presented here shows the level of GHG reduction and the shadow prices among ethanol
plants are considerably dependent on the value of emission coefficients of inputs and by
products obtained from BESS.
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I. Table of Results
Table 1.1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables used in Estimation: all are per quarter basis
a
Mean
Mean Units of
Mean quantity
price
price input &
of input &
Emission
Variables
Unit
2006-2007
2012 byproduct
byproduct
coefficient
Corn
$/Bu
3.014
6.13
Bu/gal
0.349
0.00668
N.gas
$/MBTU
7.292
5.96
MBTU/gal
0.026
0.06302
Electricity
$/KWH
0.044
0.061 KWH/gal
0.570
0.00074
DDG
$/ton
93.69
202.29 lb/gal
3.438
-0.4198
WDG
$/ton
60.24
83.12 lb/gal
2.071
-0.4079
Other cost
million $
3.576
$/gal
0.262
Ethanol
$/gal
2.051
Mill gallon
13.64
0.032
Total cost
million $
14.15
Total GHG tons
44,628
Note:a All prices are weighted average from seven studied states for month of January
and February. Natural gas and electricity prices represent average industrial price from
US Energy Information Administrative Agency. Corn price is obtained from
USDA/NASS quick stat. The price of DDG is a 10% moisture basis whereas WDG is a
weighted average of 55-60% and 60-70 % moisture basis, and both data are from USDA
Agricultural Marketing services.
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Table 1.2 Parameter Estimates of the Translog Function
Parameter
Value
Parameter
Value
0.160
0.063***
 DW
C
(0.092)
(0.017)
0.144
-0.080***
WW
N
(0.093)
(0.020)
0.171***
0.276***
 CY
E
(0.026)
(0.030)
-0.337**
0.012
 NY
D
(0.112)
(0.025)
0.862***
0.020**
 EY
W
(0.116)
(0.006)
2.005*
0.093*
 DY
Y
(0.834)
(0.037)
0.126
-0.402***
 WY
Z
(0.707)
(0.042)
-0.031**
-0.015
 CD
 CZ
(0.010)
(0.034)
0.031**
0.048
 NZ
 CW
(0.010)
(0.040)
0.047***
-0.005
 EZ
 NN
(0.013)
(0.011)
- 0.031***
0.144***
 DZ
 NE
(0.005)
(0.032)
-0.006
0.115**
 WZ
 ND
(0.012)
(0.035)
-0.010
-0.131
 YY
 NW
(0.013)
(0.234)
0.030
0.346
 YZ
 EE
(0.002)
(0.289)
0.004
-0.725**
 ZZ
 ED
(0.004)
(0.279)
-0.003
10.851***
O
 EW
(0.004)
(1.409)
-0.030
 DD
(0.022)
Note: Legend: *, ** & *** significant at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. The standard
error is in the bracket. Whereas C=Corn, N=Natural gas, E=Electricity, D=DDG,
W=WDG, Z=other cost, Y=ethanol output
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Table 1.3 Average Level of Input and Byproducts per gallon of Ethanol Under two
Objectives
Corn,
N gas,
Electricity, DDG, WDG, Ethanol,
Objective
Bu/gal MBTU/gal
KWH/gal
lb/gal lb/gal
mill gal
13.64
Cost minimizing
0.291
0.0518
1.708
4.89
1.76
13.64
GHG minimizing
0.429
0.0183
0.391
2.59
2.20
% change from cost to
GHG minimization
47%
-65%
-77%
-47%
25%
-36%

Table 1.4 GHG and Cost Reduction per gallon of Ethanol by Plant per quarter
Ethanol
Cost
GHG
Difference
Cost
GHG
Difference
plant, Mil
minimizing minimizing, from Cost to minimizing minimizing from Cost to
gal/quarter
lb/gal
lb/gal
GHG, lb/gal
$/gal
$/gal
GHG, $/gal
11.93
9.97
6.93
3.04
1.17
1.46
0.29
11.97
9.92
6.69
3.23
1.08
1.25
0.17
13.09
9.63
6.75
2.88
1.05
1.19
0.14
13.14
11.49
6.80
4.69
1.10
1.44
0.34
13.15
9.27
6.77
2.51
0.87
1.06
0.18
13.34
10.04
6.65
3.39
0.82
1.01
0.19
22.03
11.82
5.91
5.91
1.04
1.42
0.37
Average
10.20
6.68
3.52
1.01
1.24
0.23
1 t(US) = 2000 lb. The last column “Difference from Cost to GHG, $/gal” is in absolute
value
Table 1.5 Shadow Price ($/ton) CO2 equivalent by Plant per quarter
# Quarters
Ethanol,
Mean,
Std Dev,
Min,
observed
Mill gallon
$/ton
$/ton
$/ton
4
11.93
190
20
172
5
11.97
86
49
27
6
13.09
90
34
34
5
13.14
146
21
125
5
13.15
145
48
84
6
13.34
106
32
66
3
22.03
126
6
119
Average
13.64
124
46
27

Max,
$/ton
217
128
120
175
189
152
131
217
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Table 1.6 Cost and Environmental Efficiency Measure per quarter
# Quarter
Ethanol,
Cost
Environmental
observed
mil gal
efficiency
efficiency
4
11.93
1.25
0.69
5
11.97
1.14
0.68
6
13.09
1.13
0.70
5
13.14
1.31
0.59
5
13.15
1.22
0.73
6
13.34
1.22
0.66
3
22.03
1.36
0.50
Average
13.64
1.22
0.64

Table 1.7 Sensitivity of average GHG shadow price to updated (2012) prices
2006-07
only corn price
only N.gas
Corn &N.gas
survey prices
updated
price updated price updated
Shadow price, $/ton
119
161
103
167
Environmental
efficiency
0.66
0.45
0.60
0.41
Cost efficiency
1.20
1.35
1.23
1.45
Table 1.8 Allen Partial Price Elasticity Evaluated at Mean Prices and Shares for the
Translog Net Cost Function
Price of
Corn
N.gas
Electricity
DDG
WDG
Quantity of
Corn
-0.258
-0.016
N.gas
-0.507
-0.017
-0.237
-0.081
Electricity
-0.089
-0.503
-0.157
-0.093
DDG
0.703
0.337
0.090
-1.358
0.229
WDG
1.425
0.170
0.017
0.955
-2.567

all prices
updated
173
0.43
1.46
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Appendix 1
I.The price elasticity of demand for factors of production:
1.Own price elasticities of input are calculated as  ii 

2.Cross price elasticities among inputs  ij 

 ii  S i2  S i
S

i

 ij  S i S j
Si

3.Cross price elasticities between inputs and by products  ij   S jy 

 ij
S ix

II. The price elasticity of demand for by products:
2.1 Own price elasticities between by product  ii   S i 

 ii
S i

2.2 Cross price elasticities between by products  ij   S j 

1

 ij
Si

2.3 Cross price elasticities between by products and input  ij  S jx 

 ij
S iy

 represents the vector of second order parameters from the translog estimation.  ij
show a cross price coefficient among inputs, DDG and WDG. S i represent the mean
predicted share of each input and byproduct. S jx and S jy used to differentiate the share of
input from byproduct respectively while calculating cross price elasticity .
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Chapter 2: The Impact of Federal Tax Credit and Mandate on
Ethanol Market
Abstract
Using a multi-output, multi-input partial equilibrium model this article examines the
likely impact of changes in the ethanol tax credit and mandate policies on ethanol,
byproduct and corn markets. This partial equilibrium analysis is built upon an empirical
industry level cost function for corn ethanol plants with two byproducts: dried distillers
grain with soluble and wet distillers grain with soluble.
In the short-run, without the tax credit, ethanol plants will not have the incentive to
produce the minimum level of ethanol required by renewable fuel standard (RFS2)
mandate. In the long-run, for ethanol plants to have the incentive to produce the
minimum RFS2 requirement without tax credit policy, gasoline price will need to
increase by order of 50% or more. Without renewing the tax credit, however RFS2
mandate estimated to raise ethanol price to $2.81 per gallon in the short run, and in the
long-run to $2.63.
Producing the RFS2 mandate level of ethanol without tax credit will also push the short
and long run price of corn to $6.90 and $6.60 per bushel respectively compared to $6.07
per bushel without any ethanol policies.
Our estimates of the effects of ethanol tax credit and mandate on quantity and price of
ethanol, byproducts, corn and other inputs are sensitive to assumptions about the ethanol
demand elasticity and price of gasoline.
Key words: ethanol, corn, tax credit and mandate
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2.1 Introduction
The US congress ended the federal tax credit and tariff for ethanol at the end of
2011, winding up more than three decades of federal government subsidies given for
production and consumption of ethanol. However some congressional members are still
contemplating to renew the tax credit and revise the existing mandate amid growing
pressure for the development of green energy based economy. The government has been
subsidizing biofuels industry primarily through: the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax
Credit (VEETC - tax credit to refiners blending ethanol with gasoline), the Renewable
Fuel Standard (RFS1 & RFS2)5, and an import tariff.
The provision of the biofuel subsidies has been justified because they reduce
dependence on imported foreign oil, reduce greenhouse gas emissions and support rural
farm income. The objective of VEETC and RFS mandate specifically is to encourage
biofuels in greater quantity than either would without the policies. Whereas the import
tariff was set to foster the competitiveness of domestic corn ethanol producers by giving a
cost advantage over imported Brazilian sugarcane ethanol.
The above policies have actually spurred ethanol production, primarily ethanol
from corn starch to grow from about 2 billion gallons in 2002 to nearly 14 billion gallons
in 2011 and for the first time US become a net exporter of ethanol in the year 2010 (RFA,

5

The Congressionally mandated RFS2 goal is to use at least 36 billion gallons of biobased transportation fuels by 2022; 15 billion gallons can come from conventional
biofuel sources such as corn starch based ethanol. Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA) analysis indicates that ethanol from corn has been capped at 15 billion gallons in
year 2015 and beyond.
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2011). However in 2011 alone the cost of VEETC for conventional corn starch ethanol
to the Treasury in forgone revenues was more than $6 billion. Had it not expired this cost
could grow close to $7 billion in 2015 and each year thereafter under the assumption that
the RFS2 is fully met. Under the current market condition, the tax credit and RFS are
duplicative policy tools and the tax credit has no impact on ethanol production or
consumption (Babcock 2010; GAO 2009, Tyner, Taheripour, and Perkis 2010) unless a
new discretionary ethanol requirement is set.
One of the criticisms that under current market condition is the justification of
extending the tax credit and mandate so long as the demand for ethanol and gasoline
remains strong and production of ethanol from corn is becoming a mature technology.
The facets of this topic have been the subject of a great deal of research and policy debate
continues on over the efficacy of biofuel policy. The ethanol tax credit and tariff are now
gone. It is nonetheless useful to analyze the possible market impacts of ethanol policies in
order to give valuable information to the ethanol industry, fuel consumers and policy
makers to know the future market directions of ethanol.
The purpose of this article is thus to explore the primary impact of the tax credit
and RFS mandate on the 2015 expected market price of ethanol, byproducts, corn, energy
and other factor inputs employed in the production of corn ethanol. The text also
explores the distributional implication of these ethanol policies to ethanol producer and
consumer as well as tax payers. The paper also seeks to offer additional contribution in
providing perspective on ethanol byproduct markets under new alternative ethanol
policies.
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The approach taken is a multi-output, multi-input partial equilibrium market
model. This equilibrium analysis is built upon an empirical industry level cost function
for the corn based ethanol industry with two byproducts- dried distillers grain and
solubles (DDG) and wet distillers grain with solubles (WDG). The model comprises three
outputs: ethanol, DDG and WDG, four variable inputs (corn, natural gas, electricity,
labor and other), and one fixed input, aggregate plant and equipment.
The rest of this article is organized as follow: section 2 presents brief overview of
the economics of ethanol from which we developed our theoretical model. Subsection
two is devoted to explain the analytical model. The data and model calibration procedure
displayed in section three. Results with detailed discussion are presented in section 4 and
the final portion wrap up with the conclusion and implication of the article.

2.2 Theoretical Model
2.2.1 The Economics of Ethanol
Under competitive market condition the price of ethanol is determined by market
supply and demand interaction. However the presence of multiple government subsidy
policies such as VEETC, RFS and excise tax has affected the price, supply and the
demand for ethanol. The demand for ethanol is largely derived from the gasoline demand
and has gotten some of its value for its energy content as a fuel substitute, additive value
as oxygenate fuel use and octane enhancer (Babcock, Barr and Carriquiry 2010;De
Gorter and Just 2008; Miranowski 2007; Tyner, Taheripour, and Perkis 2010).
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Considering only the domestic ethanol industry, the demand curve for ethanol D
in Figure 2.1 reflects the value that blenders/ fuel refiners place on different volumes of
ethanol-the demand for ethanol represents the blender’s derived demand. The supply
curve Ss represents the shortrun domestic supply of ethanol in US. Sl represents the
longrun ethanol supply curve.

$/gallon

Ss
Sl
a

Pp

P

*

d

c

Psb

b
e

Plb

D

Q

*

Qsmt Qlm

Billion gallons

Figure 2.1 Illustration of the supply and demand curves of ethanol

The RFS2 mandate is an established floor level of consumption requiring
blending of specified amount of ethanol annually into U.S. transportation fuels. The 2012
requirement under RFS2 is 13.2 billion gallons. The RFS objective is to force blenders to
use more biofuels than they would without the mandate, whereas the VEETC support
discretionary blending above and beyond the market levels (Babcock, Barr and
Carriquiry 2010; GOA 2009; Tyner, Taheripour, and Perkis 2010).
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With already installed capacity, without any government subsidy provision the
initial short and longrun market equilibrium price and quantity of ethanol are Q  and

P * respectively, point c on figure 2.1. However, for example, with the tax credit and
RFS mandate put in place, in the short run ethanol production would go to and beyond
the mandated quantity level, Qsmt . At Qsmt , ethanol producers are willing to supply at
price P p , whereas blenders’ willingness to pay price Psb otherwise they are not willing
to blend the required amount of ethanol. The same argument holds in the long-run
period. The market equilibrium point, point C, represents an underlying short and longrun equilibrium.
RFS2 mandate is binding if and only if the required amount of ethanol exceeded
what is offered by the market, otherwise the mandate is non-binding. Therefore Qsmt
become a non-binding mandate if the required mandated RFS2 is surpassed by the market
level that is being produced. Qlm represents the year 2015 and beyond level of ethanol
production that could be produced with effective capacity of the ethanol plants ( the sum
of the capacity currently operating and plant under construction). At Qlm , plants are
assumed to supply a gallon of ethanol at a price, P p but fuel refiners are willing to pay
only Plb . This creates a wedge of ‘de’ size as shown on figure 2.1. We find point ‘e’
based on the differences between quantity of ethanol obtained at capacity and the actual
production at point Qsmt , price P * and elasticity of ethanol demand. The size of ‘ab’ is
the $0.45 per gallon ethanol tax credit. Removing the two wedges ‘ab’ and ‘de’ using
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comparative statistics gives us the underlying short and long run market equilibrium point
‘C’. The above figure illustrates how we reached to the market equilibrium point based
on the demand and supply curves. The model calibration section exposits numerically
how we reached this market equilibrium point.
Byproducts6 from corn ethanol plants represent a key component of total
industry’s revenue, and in 2011 alone about 16% of a corn based dry milling ethanol
plant’s revenue comes from DGS sales (RFA, 2011). Recently with ever increasing corn
and soybean prices and strong growth in DGS availability, the DGS market orientation
has changed the landscape of domestic livestock feed ration and hence DGS became a
partial substitute in many livestock and poultry rations for feed grains and soybean meal
(Jones et.al 2007; Westcott 2007; Klopfenstein, Erickson, and Bremer 2008).
Any ethanol policy intervention would certainly affect the price and quantity level
of the two byproducts. The analytical model section captures the two byproducts in our
displacement model. In most previous biofuel economic studies DGS has often been
incorporated in an adhoc fashion. Hence it is imperative to see the impact of various
ethanol policies on byproducts market since DGS production changes along with ethanol
production while their price track the price of both corn and soybean meal. Few studies

6

For ease of exposition DGS represents both DDG and WDG from corn ethanol plant.
The major by-product feeds from current corn-based ethanol are corn gluten feed and
corn germ meal from wet-mill ethanol plants, and distiller’s grains from dry- grind
ethanol plant. Distiller’s grains from dry-mill ethanol plants: Dried Distillers Grain (10%
mmoisture), Modified Wet Distillers Grain (50-55% moisture) , Wet Distillers Grain (6570% Moisture), distillers’ dried grains with soluble (DDGS), and condensed distillers’
soluble (CDS). A bushel of corn processed into ethanol by dry mills produces
approximately 17.5 pounds of distillers’ spent grains (RFA 2012;Hoffman and Baker,
2010).
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(Babcock 2007;Beckman, Keeny and Tyner 2011; Taheripour et.al 2010; Tokgoz et
al.2007, Tyner and Taheripour 2007) have included DGS into their partial equilibrium
models to evaluate the economic impacts of biofuel production and only few of these
studies explicitly distinguish wet and dry in the manner of this article. It is crucial to
model the byproducts separately to get an improved understanding of the byproducts
market with the changing biofuel policies.
Overall our modeling approach has two principal advantages over the past
studies: first our model comprises four factor inputs and fixed capital needed to produce
ethanol. This allows measuring the impact of ethanol policies not only in corn market but
also in natural gas and electricity market as opposed to many of the past studies that
focused only in corn market. Secondly we explicitly modeled the byproducts as
disaggregated into dry and wet to measure the consumer surplus in both byproduct
markets.

2.2.2 The Equilibrium Displacement Model
We assume there is N number of ethanol plants producing a homogeneous ethanol
and byproducts. The production technology of this ethanol industry is represented with
dual cost function C (Y ,W ) , where Y is an 3x1 vector of outputs (ethanol, DDG and
WDG) and W is 5x1 vector of four variable inputs ( corn, natural gas, electricity, labor
and other) and one fixed input ( aggregate plant and equipment). Outputs are sold at a
corresponding vector of prices, P .
The demand for ethanol and byproducts output is represented as;
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Y d  f (P d )

(1)

Where Pd represents a vector of 3x1 demand prices of ethanol, DDG and WDG. The
demand for ethanol reflects the value that blenders place on different volumes of ethanol
whereas DGS demand reflects livestock producers’ value for dry and wet byproducts. We
further assume that the ethanol industry operates under perfect competition and
production technology of the representative firm in the industry represented by constant
returns to scale. An initial zero-profit equilibrium in product and factor markets also
considered. Hence C (Y ,W ) represents the industry-level joint cost function and this cost
function is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, concave and nondecreasing
in input price. It is also homogenous of degree one with input prices and outputs.
Market clearing condition on equation 2 represents the long run equilibrium
condition that marginal cost of each output is equal to domestic prices for respective
outputs.

C (Y ,W )
 PS
Y

(2)

Where P S is the vector of supply price of ethanol and DGS.
Using Shephard's lemma, optimal factor demand can be obtained using equation 3.
C (Y , W )
 X (Y , W )
W

(3)

Equation 3 represents the derived demand for input X in the production of a given
levels of ethanol and DGS.
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Factor supply or the joint output is given by Equation 4 and it is a function of input
prices.

X  g (W )

(4)

Ethanol price wedges due to ethanol tax credit to blenders represented as

P1 S
P1 d

=1+ 

(5a)

Where P1S represents per gallon ethanol producers price and P1d is the per gallon price of
ethanol that blenders pay.
 is the wedge on the price of ethanol between what blenders pay and ethanol producers
receive This wedge is measured as a percentage of the initial equilibrium price of
ethanol, and is considered an exogenous policy variable, in our case it is the per gallon
amount of tax credit.
The ethanol consumption mandate will also create an output wedge between what the
ethanol pans willing to produce and fuel refiners willing to blend with prevailing market
prices. Mathematically this is shown in equation 5b below:

Y 1m
Y1*

 1 

(5b)

Where, Y 1m is the 2015 and beyond minimum level of ethanol quantity consumption, i.e.,
15 billion gallons of corn ethanol. Whereas

Y1* is the short and long run market
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equilibrium quantity level which actually corresponds to Q * on figure 2.1 above.

 is

the wedge that captures the percentage change in the quantity of ethanol to reach to the
mandated level.
The current technological structure of the US ethanol industry is adapted and
some of the elasticies are econometrically estimated from a recent survey of Midwest
ethanol plants (Perrin, Fretes and Sesmero 2009). Our model treats the U.S. ethanol
economy as being closed to international ethanol trade.
Derivatives of the cost function could be expressed in terms of various elasticities
and share parameters. Totally differentiating equations 1 through 5 and converting them
into elasticity form, yields system of logarithmic differential equation, from 6 through 11,
expressed in terms of relative changes and elasticities.
d ln Y  d ln P

(6)

d

Where  is a 3x3 price elasticity of demand for ethanol and DGS



P sY

d ln Y  

P sW d

d ln W d  d ln P s

(7)

Where  P sY and  P sW d represent 3X3 and 3 X 5 matrices of output supply elasticities and
marginal cost elasticities with respect to input price . The mathematical detail for how
we calculated the elasticities is presented in the mathematical footnotes in appendix 2.

 XY

d ln Y   XW d ln W d  d ln X

(8)
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Where  XW is a 5X5 output-constant derived demand elasticity matrix and  XY is a 5 by 3
elasticity of demand for input X with respect to output Y. Elasticity of input with respect
to output is equal to unit Y under constant return to scale.
A factor supply function in elasticity forms gives us:
d ln X  d ln W s

(9)

where  is a 5 by 5 excess factor supply elasticity matrix. Since there is no wedge
between price of input demand and supply, the following relationship holds W s = W d =
W

the tax credit and mandate wedges in the percentage form from equation 5a and 5b are
converted into the following forms :

d ln P s  d ln P d  d

(10)

d ln Y1  d ln Y1*  d

(11)

The above equations are solved to evaluate the changes in market outputs and
inputs price and quantity that would occur under different ethanol policies. The
equilibrium displacement model framework of this portion is taken from Perrin (2009).
The welfare gains and loss in each market are also calculated in the usual manner via as a
change in producer surpluses, consumer surpluses, and government tax revenue.
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2.3 Model Calibration
We first seek market equilibrium outcomes by parameterizing the corn ethanol
demand and supply curves for the year 2015. This market equilibrium point, we call it a
baseline (or status quo), is the situation in which no tax credit and mandate policies
against which we simulate the impact of renewing the tax credit, and RFS2 mandate
policy both in the short and long-run, point C on figure 2.1. We summarize how we
reached the long run market equilibrium outcome as follow: we first assume constant
elasticity supply and demand curves for corn ethanol, and calibrated to fit 2011 data.
These supply and demand curves are assumed to be linear. We again assumed that the
effective capacity of corn ethanol production in 2015 will be about 14.25 billion gallons
(existing capacity plus capacity of plants under construction). We further assume that in
2015 plant is willing to supply a gallon of ethanol at wholesale price that prevailed in
year 2011. We take the year 2011 producer price of ethanol as the average wholesale
FOB price for Midwest, $2.55 per gallon. We computed the price that blenders willing to
pay for a gallon of ethanol based on the 2011 price of ethanol, 2015 quantity supply of
ethanol at the capacity, and the demand elasticity of ethanol7. Finally using the
comparative statistic we estimated our base model (or status quo), i.e., the market
equilibrium outcomes, by removing the wedge between per gallon price that ethanol
producers willing to sell and fuel refiners willing to buy. This market equilibrium point,

7

The formal equation used is : d ln Y

demand.

 d ln p d , where 

is price elasticity of ethanol
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Point C on figure 2.1, represents the short and long run market equilibrium point. The
fact that our base configuration is based on the year 2011 data, using comparative
statistics removing the $045 per gallon of ethanol tax credit that was active in year 2011,
will give us the short-run market equilibrium outcomes.
With respect to byproduct market, throughout the analysis we assumed both DDG
and WDG have constant demand and supply curves. The supply elasticity of DDG and
WDG are econometrically estimated based on a translog cost function we built on chapter
1. Moreover, the derived demand elasticities of corn, natural gas and electricity are also
econometrically estimated using a translog cost function. We also calculated excess
factor supply elasticity for all input considered8. Where there is no complete information
for the remaining elasticity of inputs, the article uses information from related studies and
configured these elasticities in a manner consistent with our model. Details of the
elasticity figures and the value of other relevant parameters are presented from table 2.1
through 2.6.
Key assumptions made were that ethanol and the two byproducts quantity is the
domestically produced in the US with no imports. We also assume that the demand curve
for ethanol shifts out by due to a change in the wholesale premium gasoline price at the
rack. To determine the size of the shift in ethanol demand, we assumed that ethanol
serves as an imperfect substitute to gasoline in US market. To invoke this shift in ethanol
demand, we used cross demand elasticity of ethanol with respect to gasoline price 1.056
as estimated by Miranowski (2007).
8

The mathematical appendix section shows how we computed the excess supply
elasticity.

40

The short and long run corn ethanol supply elasticities used are 0.65 and 0.25
based on Elobeid & Tokgoz (2008), and Miranowski (2007) respectively. Whereas the
short and long run corn demand elasticities for corn ethanol are -0.89 and -2.9 obtained
from Miranowski (2007) and Luchansky & Monks (2009) respectively. The remaining
elasticities for factor input and byproducts are listed on the parameters and values
description section at the end of the text. The short-run and long-run periods for all inputs
and outputs are differentiated based on types of demand and supply elasticity curves used
in the model.

2.4 Sensitivity Analysis
We simulate the impact of extending tax credit and mandate from the short and
long-run market equilibrium point we described above. The two scenarios we built from
our baseline outcome are:
(1) Extending tax credit, i.e., $0.45 per gallon to ethanol blenders/refiners
(2) Mandate , enforcing producers to produce the minimum level of ethanol required by
RFS2
In order to investigate the sensitivity of price and quantity of ethanol as well as
byproducts and all inputs to ranges of gasoline price at the rack, we run sensitivity
analysis based on a possible percent increase in wholesale premium gasoline price from
the base year to the anticipated short and long run period. In the base model, we take
$3.18 per gallon average wholesale rack price of premium gasoline.
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We ran the above scenarios each time for both short and long run period. The
wide range of parameter values of demand and supply elasticity for ethanol and factor
inputs shown from table 1A through 1f suggests that the outcomes of the different policy
scenarios of depend on these parameters.
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2.5 Empirical Result
The results of the ethanol policy simulations are summarized in tables 2.7 through
2.13. The results in table 2.7 through 2.9 contain the short and long-run market prices
and quantities changes in output markets in combination with changes in some key
assumptions. Table 2.10 and 2.11 shows the results of the welfare changes, i.e. change in
consumer and producer surplus as a percent of initial value from the baseline outcome
when the new alternative policies prevail in the ethanol, byproduct and factor markets.
Table 2.12 and 2.13 contain the change on natural gas and electricity factor market price
and quantities.

2.5.1 The Market Effects of Ethanol without Tax credit and Mandate
We first summarized the baseline short and long-run market equilibrium
outcomes for all outputs and inputs considered in this model. Thus the long-run market
equilibrium quantity of ethanol for 2015 estimated to be is 12.16 billion gallon, a 9% fall
from the base quantity level. The per gallon market equilibrium price of ethanol is $2.39,
a 6 % fall to the ethanol producer and 17 % rise to the ethanol refiners compared to what
they were getting in the base configuration. Since the production of both byproducts
trail along with the level of ethanol production, any change in quantity of ethanol
production certainly affect the prices and quantity supply of both byproducts. At the
estimated market equilibrium, corn price is $6.07 per bushel. The above results are
presented on the second column of table 2.7. We now start to seek the market outcomes
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of the impact of extending the $0.45 per gallon tax credit to ethanol blenders, enforcing
RFS2 mandate of 15 billion gallon of ethanol from year 2015 and beyond. We also ran a
sensitivity analysis to see the impact of gasoline price on the market outcomes of price
and quantity of ethanol and other key variables.

2.5.2 The Short-run Market Effects of Ethanol Tax credit and Mandate
In the short run with the extension of the tax credit, ethanol production will reach
an estimated 13.24 billion gallon per year (bgy), 9% increase from market equilibrium
outcome. Ethanol producers are willing to supply this for $2.60 whereas refiners willing
to buy for $2.15 per gallon which shows the $0.45 per gallon tax credit to be distributed
almost equally. Under the mandate of 15 bgy, the price that ethanol producer willing to
supply will be $2.94 per gallon while ethanol refiners buy at $1.76. The outcome from
this mandate is a $1.20 per gallon price wedge between what producers would be willing
to supply and what fuel blenders willing to pay voluntarily. The detail of the results are
shown on table 2.7.
We injected a 10% change on gasoline price in our equlibruim market outcome
and computed the impact of this price change on the markets for ethanol and associated
products, with and without tax credit and mandate policy scenario. While without tax
credit and mandate, the 10% change in gasoline price alone will induce an additional 0.68
billion gallons of ethanol and $0.13 per gallon raise on the price that ethanol producer use
to supply and fuel refiners used to buy as shown on table 2.7. While producing at the
RFS2 minimum mandate level, the 10% change on gasoline price will drive down the
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producer price of ethanol to $2.81 per gallon, shrinking the wedge between producer and
refiners to $0.77 per gallon compared to without gasoline price shock.
We can argue that had the tax credit been extended and again at the same time
there would be a 10 % change in gasoline price, the overall ethanol production would
increase close to 14 bgy, i.e., by adding up the additional gain of 0.68 bgy from a 10%
gasoline price effect on the final quantity of ethanol we obtained with the tax credit.
Technically we can obtain 14 billion gallon of ethanol, close to the RFS2 mandated level,
with $0.45 per gallon subsidy.
In this segment, for ease of exposition among four of the policy simulations result
on the byproducts market (table 2.7), we only discuss the market outcomes that we
obtained without tax credit and mandate policy with the combination of the impact of a
change on premium gasoline price. With the tax credit, the equilibrium quantities of
DDG rise almost by 1.24 mmt (7.4%) while its price falls by $13 per ton (6%) compared
with the longrun equilibrium market outcomes. Likewise production of WDG will rise
by 1.1 mmt (8.5%) and its price fall by $11 per ton (9%). Without the tax credit and
mandate policy, a 10% increase in gasoline price alone induced almost a 6% increase in
ethanol supply which eventually would increase the supply of both byproducts. This
change in ethanol supply actually resulted in an additional 0.8 and 0.7 mmt of DDG and
WDG respectively while their per ton price fell by about $7 as shown on table 2.
Changing the price of gasoline while producing at mandated level of ethanol will not bear
any change on the quantity and price of both byproducts from what we obtained without
change in premium gasoline price.
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In factor market, all factor input will change linearly and proportionally with the
percentage change in quantity of ethanol in both policy interventions we analyzed. A
particular market that deserves attention is a corn market since as high as 40 percent of
domestically produced corn goes to ethanol production and the cost of corn in the total
operating cost of ethanol is nearly 72%. Extending tax credit will in short-run stimulate
the demand for corn by 9%, that will lead the overall corn demand for the year to reach to
4.8 billion bushel while price of corn will increase to $6.4 per bushel (5.4%). Whereas
without any policy interventions, a 10% change in gasoline price alone resulted in an
additional quarter billion bushel of corn demand and $0.20 per bushel price differential
from the equilibrium outcomes. Therefore the demand for corn would go up about 5
billion bushel and per bushel price will rise to $6.6, if we were certain of the tax credit
and a 10% increase in premium gasoline. Ethanol plant would demand about 5.4 billion
of bushels to produce at the mandate level and this pushes the price of corn upward to
$6.90 per bushel as shown on table 2.7. Overall the price of corn will increase by 5 to 14
% in all of the policy simulations we ran.
Returns to the owners of the capital will increase by 12% if the tax credit is
implemented while with binding mandate this increase would be around 31 % compared
with the market equilibrium outcome without any interventions. With respect to the
energy market, the change in the price of both electricity and natural gas was
insignificant, i.e., less than one percent as presented on table 2.11.
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2.5.3 The Long-run Market Effects of Ethanol Tax credit and Mandate
In this section we reran the same policy analysis but using long-run elasticities of
demand and supply curves. Extending the tax credit will actually spur greater production
of ethanol, 15.11 billion of gallons, surpassing slightly the 15 bgy mandate, (table 2.8).
Ethanol producers will sell for $2.64 while blenders could be willing to pay $2.19 per
gallon, an 11% raise and 9% fall respectively compared with the base market equilibrium
price of $2.39. While with mandate policy scenario, it is quite interesting to see that both
prices would change the same as with the tax credit. It turn out that the outcomes leave
the wedge between these two prices almost equal to the $0.45 per gallon tax credit and
much less than a $1.20 price wedge we obtained with the same (mandate) scenario in the
short-run. Without any tax credit and mandate, a 10% increase in gasoline price will
result only an additional 0.57 billion gallon ethanol and a nickel per gallon price change.
With a combination of mandate and a 10% increase on gasoline price change, however,
the price producer receive will not change but refiners would be willing to pay almost
$0.10 higher.
We further ran a sensitivity analysis with 50 and 60 % change in the price of
premium gasoline compared to the base line price, results on table 2.8 and 2.9. The
impact of 50% change would result exactly the same quantity and price change for
outputs and inputs except ethanol producer price as obtained with the mandate outcome
as shown on table 2.8, column 2. The implication of this outcome is that the amount of
ethanol produced would just be equivalent to the required mandate but the price wedge
created between ethanol producers and refiner because of mandate policy will vanish.
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We further increased the change in gasoline price to 60% to see price and
quantity impact across producer and consumer. Without tax credit and mandate policy,
ethanol production would reach 15.6 bgy, i.e., an additional 3.4 billion gallon and $0.30
per gallon change from market equilibrium table 2.8. However had it been with tax
credit extended, ethanol production would have been 18.5 billion gallon and per gallon
price would $2.93 and $2.48 to ethanol producer and refiners respectively. Ethanol
producer willing to supply the required minimum mandate level of ethanol with $2.63 per
gallon irrespective of the change in price of premium gasoline but ethanol refiners would
pay more as the price of gasoline goes up and eventually would willing to pay higher than
that the ethanol producers willingness to supply, as shown on the last column of table 2.8.
The mandate by itself will increase the price of ethanol by $0.56 and $0.24 per gallon to
the ethanol producers and decrease to ethanol fuel refiners by $0.24 and 0.19 per gallon
in the short and long run respectively, results on table 2.7 and 2.8.
With respect to byproduct markets, DDG production would increase to 21 mmt
while per ton price falls around $180. Production and price of WDG also follows change
in ethanol production as does DDG, hence the quantity of WDGS will be as high as 16
mmt while its price will fall as low as $70 per ton with a higher gasoline price as
depicted on table 2.8.
In the factor markets, the renewal of the tax credit induces more production of
ethanol and eventually the demand for corn would reach to close to 5.4 billion of bushels
and the price of corn hit almost $6.6 per bushel, (table 2.8). Under assumption of constant
gasoline price, with each tax credit and mandate policy intervention, there will be an
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approximately 8% increase on the price of corn. The corn price will go close to $7.20 per
bushel and the total corn demand will jump to 6.6 billion bushel if the tax credit extended
and at the same time the current gasoline price increased by 60%.
Overall extending the tax credit could potentially stimulate ethanol production
and eventually create an upward pressure on the demand for corn. Depending on the
simulated outcomes, some of our results conform with the findings of (Babcock &
Fabiosa 2011; Taheripour and Tyner 2010) 9 that expansion of ethanol has contributed to
higher corn prices.
Livestock producers face substantially higher feed costs. To livestock producers
the key determinant of ethanol policy change is how much cost advantage does livestock
producers could get from the net effect in the domestic feed market as a result of high
DGS supply against high corn price.
With regard to energy consumption, the demand for both natural gas and
electricity will increase linearly with the percentage change in ethanol quantity under
each policy simulation we ran. However the equilibrium market price of electricity and
natural gas are barely affected by additional demand for energy from ethanol industry.
Some of the factor market outcomes for selected inputs are presented on table 2.12 and
2.13.

9

If the blender tax credit had been abolished and if no mandates had been adopted,
subsidies contributed an average of $0.14 per bushel (8%) to the increase in corn prices
averaging across 2006–2009 (Babcock & Faiosa 2011). Between 2004 and early in 2008,
out of $4/bushel increase, US ethanol subsidy contributed only $1 (25%), and the
remaining $3 was attributed due to the demand pull of higher crude oil price (Taheripour
and Tyner 2010).
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2.5.4 The Short and Long-run Welfare Implication of Tax Credit and
Mandate
In this segment, we examine the change in consumer and producer surplus in the
ethanol, byproduct and factor markets under tax credit and mandate policies and their
sensitivity to the change in gasoline price both in short and long run period.
In the short-run, renewing the tax credit alone would result in a 10% (3 billion
dollars) gain to ethanol buyers as a consumer surplus while with the mandate this gain
will reach to 29 % (8.5 billion dollars). The percent change is computed from the initial
value of ethanol obtained at the market equilibrium outcome. We further explored the
sensitivity of consumer and producer surplus for a 10% change in the premium gasoline
price from the current $3.05; see the results presented on table 4. Under mandate
scenario, the gain in the consumer surplus dropped to 16% (4.7 billion dollar) by the time
we administered a 10% change gasoline price. Without tax credit and mandate, an
increase in gasoline price will result ethanol fuel consumer to gain 6% (1.7 billion dollar)
as consumer surplus compared to what they used to get at the equilibrium market
outcome.
In the long-run, the gain in consumer surplus generally will be smaller compared
than the short-run. Moreover the size of gain in consumer surplus in each case of tax
credit and mandate policy will be more or less similar. Without tax credit and mandate
and again if gasoline price increases by 10%, there will be a 2% loss in consumer surplus.
By the time gasoline price increased by 60%, there will be 15% loss in a consumer
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surplus at the mandate level. Without tax credit and mandate policy, the gain in
consumer surplus will be around 14% (4 billion dollars).
Under a tax credit, expanded ethanol production came at substantial cost as
forgone revenue to the government. For example, extending the tax credit in the shortrun the cost of the subsidy as forgone revenue will be 21% (6 billion dollars) while in the
long-run it would go up to 23% (7 billion dollars) of the initial value of ethanol.
Based on results on table 2.7 and table 2.8, the cost of the mandate would be 61%
of the initial value of ethanol in short run and ultimately fall to 22% in the long-run if we
assume with constant gasoline price. When we relaxed the constant gasoline price
assumption and increased gasoline by 10 %, this cost dropped and eventually get zero by
the time gasoline price increased by 50% (based on table 2.9). The above cost is the cost
pass along to the fuel consumer at the pump because of binding ethanol consumption
mandate.
As it can be retrieved from table 2.8, under mandate, ethanol plants would willing
to sell for $2.94 per gallon which is $1.20 per gallon higher than what fuel refiners are
voluntarily willing to pay. However to meet the yearly blend amount issued by EPA,
ethanol blenders will obtain a gallon of ethanol at whatever price ethanol producers are
to supply. Eventually blenders pass through the price difference to motor fuel buyers at
the pump. Moreover, it is apparent that the provision of a tax credit and mandate policy
also led to an additional deadweight losses (DWL) that range from 1 to 6% of the initial
value of ethanol. The DWL will be higher under mandate than tax credit policy in the
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short-run but the converse is true in the longer run. It is also true that as the price of
gasoline increases, the DWL shrinks.
Table 2.10 and 2.11 also present selective results of the consumer surplus for both
dry and wet byproducts with each tax credit and mandate policy. The gain in consumer
surplus from WDG as a percentage of its initial value is higher for WDG than DDG in all
policy simulations. The gain in consumer surplus for both WDG and DDG will fall
substantially with an increase in gasoline price.
In the factor market for brevity we only present the producer surplus of corn
producers and ethanol plant owners. By extending the tax credit alone, in the long-run
the gain in producer surplus to corn producers will be 10% of the initial value of corn that
at market equilibrium, which is twice the level of change in the short run. We calculated
the initial value of corn based on the market equilibrium price of corn and the quantity of
corn, 10.7 billion bushels, the 2011 cropping year domestic corn production. The percent
gain in the producer surplus will be constant at 12 % irrespective of the change in
gasoline price at the mandate level since the additional demand for corn and its price is
constant. Without tax credit and mandate intervention, a 60% increase in gasoline price
will offer the highest gain to corn producer. In fact every increase in the price of corn
allows the corn producers to gain proportional surplus whereas corn consumers lose some
surplus since they have to pay more for a bushel of corn.
To ethanol plant owners each ethanol policy intervention and in also corn price
movements have a direct implication to sustain the ethanol production business. We
computed the producer surplus of ethanol plant owner as a percentage of the rent value at
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the initial equilibrium point. In the short-run the gain in producer surplus is higher in the
mandate than tax credit scenario. The tax credit alone will give almost a 10% gain to
ethanol owners as producer surplus of the initial value of rent. Without tax credit and
mandate, a 10% increase in gasoline price alone will render a 6% gain in producer
surplus to the ethanol plant owners. In the long run, returns to plants owners will start to
decline with both policy interventions. In the long-run the gain as producer surplus as a
result of mandate wills substantially small (3%), contrary to the huge gain (26%)
obtained in the short-run. The increase in gasoline price alone will give higher gain of
producer surplus in short-run than in the long-run.
In this model with initial zero-profit equilibrium in the ethanol markets, all
revenue losses or gains are passed through to the ethanol input markets, which of course
include owners of ethanol plants (capital). It is evident that the net social benefit would
be less with tax credit and mandate compared to no policies.
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2.6 Conclusion and Policy Implications
This article constructed a multi-output, multi-input partial market equilibrium
model to explore the short and long run impacts of changing the two key ethanol policy
drivers: the tax credit and the RFS2 mandate. The model was calibrated according to the
year 2011 observations. The study provides some quantitative estimates of the impacts
of possible extension of tax credit and binding RFS2 mandate impacts on the prices and
quantities of ethanol, byproducts, corn and other inputs with the combination of change
in existing price of gasoline over a range of different assumptions.
In the short run, irrespective of the tax credit policy, the production of ethanol will
be consistently below the mandated 15 bgy by 12 to 14 % . Yet contrary to this in the
long-run, extending the tax credit will stimulate ethanol plants to produce above the
minimum mandate amount.
In the long-run, if ethanol plants are to produce the mandated level without tax
credit policy, gasoline price would need to increase by order of 50% relative to the 2011
level. In addition, as long as the RFS2 mandate is in place, there will be a wedge
between the prices that ethanol producers are willing to sell and fuel blenders are willing
to pay. This wedge will shrink as the price of gasoline increases and eventually vanishes
as gasoline price increased by 50%. In the short-run, the RFS2 mandate will create wedge
as large as $1.20 per gallon.
With respect to the corn market, our empirical results asserted that the mandate
alone will increase the corn price by $0.83 and $0.50 per bushel in short and long run
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respectively. If there were a 10% increase in gasoline price with no policies, the price of
corn will rise to $6.27 (short-run) and $6.17 (long-run) per bushel.
In the long-run, the gain of ethanol plant owners as producer surplus from either
policy will be just 3% as a percent of the initial value of rent, substantially lower than the
10-26% gain in the short-run. Likewise, the gain of ethanol consumers from the policies
shrinks as the price of gasoline increases
It is just a year now that the tax credit and tariffs supports for ethanol expired, and
it is unlikely that these financial incentives will be renewed. Entry of new ethanol plants
seems not realistic given that the corn ethanol industry has already reached the
production capacity required to meet the RFS2 requirement. Our quantitative analysis
indicates that without extending the tax credit and mandate, achieving the effective
mandated requirement is unlikely. Ethanol plants operate at less than full capacity or
some ethanol plants may close at least temporarily unless the price of gasoline increases
substantially.
To sum up the key question is whether the ethanol industry can fully utilize their
current and future capacity to supply the minimum RFS2 required quantity without a tax
credit or mandate to do so. Among host of factors our analysis underscores that without
tax credit extension, if gasoline price increase by order of 50% and above 2011 level,
ethanol production and consumption will achieve the minimum level of ethanol required
by the RFS2.
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I. Parameters and Values Used to Calibrate the Model

Table 2.1 Parameters used to calibrate the model
Parameters

Value

Source/explanation

Demand elasticity of Ethanol, short-run

-0.89

Miranowski, (2007

Demand elasticity of Ethanol, longrun

-2.9

Luchansky & Monks (2009)

Supply elasticity of Ethanol, short-run

0.29

Miranowski, (2007),

Supply elasticity of ethanol, long-run
Demand elasticity of ethanol with
gasoline

0.65

Elobeid & Tokgoz (2008)

1.06

Miranowski, (2007)

Demand elasticity of DDG

-1.28

Bechman et.al (2010)

Demand elasticity of WDG

-0.40

Babcock (2009)

Demand elasticity of investment capital

-0.74

Goolsbee (1999)

Demand elasticity of labor
Ethanol produced in one bushel
MMBTU per gallon ethanol needed

-0.61
2.86
0.0263

Rich (2010)
Renewable Fuel Association (2012)
Perrin et.al (2008)

KWH per gallon ethanol needed

0.5700

Perrin et.al (2008)
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Table 2.2 Value of Variables used to calibrate the model (raw data)
Parameters

Value

Source/explanation

Ethanol price ($/gal)

2.55

Ethanol FOB price, Average for Midwest

Ethanol supply (billion gallons)

13.95

Ethanol supply (billion gallons)

14.25

2011 actual production, RFA (2012)
Domestic production with 2015 capacity, RFA
(2012)

Gasoline price ($/gal)

3.05

DDG price ($/ton)
a

202.29

Premium gasoline rack price, EIA (2012)
Weighted average for corn belt states (10%
moisture basis), USDA Agricultural Marketing
services: http://marketnews.usda.gov/portal/lg

DDG supply (mmt)

18.9

WDG Price ($/ton)

83.18

U.S. Census Bureau Division of Manufacturing
Weighted average for corn belt states ( 55-60% and
60-70 % moisture), USDA Agricultural Marketing
services: http://marketnews.usda.gov/portal/lg

a

14.53

U.S. Census Bureau Division of Manufacturing

Corn supply, billion bushels

10.7

b

6.40

U.S. corn long-term projections for 2011/2012
Weighted average farm price of corn (
USDA/NASS)

6.89

Industrial price, EIA (2012)

WDGS supply (mmt)

Corn price ($/bushel)

Electricity price ($/KWH)

Natural gas ($/MMBTU)
4.91
Industrial price, EIA (2012)
Note: aQuantity of DDG and WDG is from U.S. Census Bureau Division of
Manufacturing, Mining and Construction Statistics - Report M311J - Fats and Oils,
Oilseed Crushing (Table 4b).
b
Corn price is national average obtained from USDA/NASS quick stat.
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Table 2.3 Econometrically estimated elasticity parameters based on translog cost
function10
Parameters
Value
Derived demand elasticity of corn
-0.02
Derived demand elasticity of electricity
-0.14
Derived demand elasticity of natural gas
-1.06
Supply elasticity of DDG
1.34
Supply elasticity of WDG
1.26
Cross supply price elasticity between DDG with WDG
0.04
Cross supply price elasticity between WDG with DDG
0.099

10

The remaining inverse output supply elasticity in the 3 by 3 matrix is recovered using
n

homogeneity and reciprocity restriction. The homogeneity restriction implies  ij  0 .
j 1

The reciprocity restriction implies S jij  Si ji , where S j , S i are share of input in total
cost for output i . where ij is price elasticity of output. Where, n = 3 and i  j . The same
approach is used to recover the 5 by 5 derived demand elasticity for inputs.
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Table 2.4 Calculated excess input supply elasticity used to calibrate the model
Short-run
Long-run
total market
supply
elasticity
0.23
0.10
1.89
0.77

Market
share to
ethanol
0.335
0.004
0.031
5E-05

Excess
total market
Market
Excess
supply to
supply
share to
supply to
ethanol
elasticity
ethanol
ethanol
Corn
1.68
0.62
0.350
2.75
Electricity
50.0
2.10
0.004
696
Natural gas
65
0.59
0.030
36
labor & other
27951
1.38
5E-05
40280
Capital
0.001
5
Note: Market share to ethanol is an author calculation based on the 2011 and projected
data. For corn is from USDA, Natural gas and electricity based on data from US Energy
Information Administration. Labor is from US Census Bureau. Other (enzyme, chemical,
water, other) is based on US Census Bureau, Division of Manufacturing.
Sources of Short and long run total supply elasticity respectively; Corn: Gardner (2007),
Moss, Livanis & Scmitz (2010). Electricity and Natural gas: AEO (2010), National
Energy Models (EMF 2003). Labor: Rich (2010). Capital: Edgerton (2010)

Table 2.5 The cost share of input/Marginal Cost elasticity used in both short and long run
model
Cost share
Corn
0.72
Electricity
0.01
Natural gas
0.05
Labor & other
0.10
Capital
0.11
Note: the details how these shares were calculated presented in table 1f. The share of
capital is calculated as the share of rent from the total revenue.
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Table 2.6 Parameters used to compute the cost share of variable inputs
Quantity of input
Average
Cost component
Per gallon of ethanol
price
Corn
2.86
6.01
Electricity
0.5700
0.0688
Natural gas
0.0202
5.00
Additional N.gas for drying 60% of DGS
0.0093
5.00
Labor & management
0.0005
113.1
Other (enzyme, chemical, water , other)
0.0013
194.1
Note: Price and quantity definition for corn, electricity and natural gas are: $/bushel,
$/kWh and $/MMBTU respectively.
Note: Implicit quantity indexes is calculated by dividing survey sample expenditures on
personnel and on all other processing inputs by the sample-period average values of the
respective price indexes. Share of each input is the cost share in total revenue. The cost
of each input is computed taking the price of input multiplied by the quantity index. The
quantity index of the four inputs, except capital, is computed by taking the average input
requirement per gallon of ethanol obtained from Perrin et.al (2009) and multiplying it by
the 2011 annual ethanol production. The price of labor is the Employment Cost Index
(series CIS101) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics; the price of other is the Producer
Price Index for the ethyl alcohol manufacturing industry (series PCU325193325193)
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/data/#prices). For further
understanding how the author computed the cost components refer table 2 and equation 4
in Perrin et.al (2009).
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II. Tables of Results
Table 2.7 The Shor-trun policy impacts: estimated market-clearing prices and quantities
of outputs
Constant gasoline
10 % gasoline price
price
increase
Initial
With
With
Without
With
base
Market
Tax
Mandate mandate & Mandate
value
equilibrium
credit
tax credit
Ethanol, billion gal
14.3
12.16
13.24
15.00
12.84
15.00
Ethanol producer ,$/gal
2.55
2.39
2.60
2.94
2.52
2.81
Ethanol consumer ,$/gal
2.05
2.39
2.15
1.76
2.52
2.04
DDG, mmt
19.3
16.9
18.1
20.1
17.7
20.1
Price of DDG, $/ton
202
222
209
189
214
189
WDG, mmt
14.8
12.7
13.8
15.5
13.4
15.5
Price of WDG, $/ton
83
98
88
70
92
70
Corn, billion bushel
5.1
4.39
4.78
5.40
4.63
5.40
Price of corn, $/bushel
6.4
6.07
6.38
6.89
6.27
6.89

Table 2.8 The Long-run policy impacts: market-clearing prices and quantities of outputs
Constant
10 % increase in
60% increase in
gasoline price
gasoline price
gasoline price
With
Without
With
Without mandate
Tax
With
mandate &
Mandate
& tax credit
Variables
credit Mandate tax credit
Ethanol, billion gallon
15.11
15.0
12.73
15.0
15.57
2.64
2.63
2.43
2.63
2.68
Ethanol producer price, $/gal
Ethanol consumer price, $/gal
2.19
2.19
2.43
2.28
2.68
DDG, mmt
20.4
20.3
17.6
20.3
20.9
Price of DDG, $/ton
186
187
215
187.4
180
WDG, mmt
15.7
15.6
13.3
15.6
16.1
Price of WDG, $/ton
69
70
93
70
64
Corn, billion bushel
5.4
5.4
4.6
5.4
5.59
Price of corn, $/bushel
6.59
6.57
6.17
6.57
6.67
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Table 2.9 The Long-run mandate policy impacts: market-clearing prices and quantities of
ethanol with 50% increase in premium gasoline price
Constant
10 %
50 %
60 %
Variables
gasoline price
increase
increase
increase
Ethanol, billion gallon
15.0
15.0
15.0
15.0
2.63
2.63
2.63
2.63
Ethanol producer price, $/gal
2.19
2.28
2.68
2.71
Ethanol consumer price, $/gal
Note: Under the mandate policy, the change on gasoline price has only effect on the
ethanol consumer price. Hence mandate has no effects on the rest of the quantity and
price variable.

Table 2.10 Short-run effect of shock on consumers (CS) and producer surplus (PS), as a
percent of the initial value at the market equilibrium point
Constant gasoline
10 % gasoline price
price
increase
Initial market value
With
With
Without
With
at equilibrium
Tax
Mandate mandate &
Mandate
Variables
(Billions dollar)
credit
tax credit
29.0
10.4
29.3
5.7
16.0
Ethanol, CS
3.8
6.4
19.5
3.9
19.5
DDG, CS
1.2
12.2
37.8
7.3
37.8
WDG, CS
65
5.0
12.1
3.2
12.1
Corn producer, PS
4.5
9.9
26.0
6.2
26.0
Ethanol Plant owners, PS
Cost to tax payers
20.5
0.0
(% of initial value of ethanol)
Dead Weight Loss
0.84
5.8
0.0
3.7
(% of initial value of ethanol)
Note: the change in a PS for ethanol plant owner is computed from the initial value of the
rent. The cost to tax payers and DWL are computed as percent loss from the Initial value
of ethanol.
Note: The initial value of each output is computed as a product of price and quantity from
initial market equilibrium outcome, i.e., without any policy intervention, whereas for
Ethanol Plant owner’s is the rent at year 2011. Initial corn value is calculated for the
entire corn market based on the total production in year 2011/12.
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Table 2.11 Long-run Effect of shock on consumers (CS) and producer surplus (PS)as a
percent of the initial value at the market equilibrium point
Constant gasoline 10 % increase in
60% increase in
price
gasoline price
gasoline price
With
With
Without
With
Without
With
Tax
Mandate mandate & Mandate
mandate &
mandate
Variables
credit
tax credit
tax credit
9.4
9.0
2.1
4.9
13.9
15.4
Ethanol, CS
21.2
20.3
3.3
20.3
25.5
20.3
DDG, CS
40.2
38.4
6.1
38.4
48.4
38.4
WDG, CS
10.6
11.6
2.1
11.6
12.4
11.6
Corn producer, PS
3.1
3.0
0.7
3.0
3.5
3.0
Ethanol Plant owners, PS
Cost to tax payers
24.8
0.0
0.0
(% of initial value of ethanol)
Dead Weight Loss
2.3
2.1
0.0
1.7
0.0
0.43
(% of initial value of ethanol)
Table 2.12 The Short-run estimated market-clearing prices and quantities of energy
inputs
Constant gasoline
price
10 % gasoline price increase
Market
With Tax
With
Without
With
equilibrium
credit
Mandate
mandate &
Mandate
tax credit
Natural gas, billion BTU
8.39
10.03
11.34
9.74
11.34
Natural gas, $/MBTU
4.89
4.91
4.92
4.90
4.92
Electricity, billion
KWH
8.34
9.96
11.25
9.66
11.25
Electricity, cent/KWH
6.88
6.90
6.92
6.90
6.92
Table 2.13 The Long-run estimated market-clearing prices and quantities of energy inputs
Constant gasoline
10 % gasoline price
60 % gasoline price
increase
increase
price

Natural gas, billion BTU
Natural gas, $/MBTU
Electricity, billion KWH
Electricity, cent/KWH

With Tax
credit

With
Mandate

11.40
4.91
11.34
6.89

11.32
4.91
11.27
6.89

Without
mandate &
tax credit
9.65
4.90
9.58
6.89

With
Without
Mandate mandate &
tax credit
11.32
11.74
4.91
4.92
11.27
11.69
6.89
6.89

With
Mandate
11.32
4.91
11.27
6.89
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Appendix 2

C (Y , W )
 C w  X (Y , W )
W

2a

Mathematical Footnotes
Totally differentiating of C w

I. Market clearing condition
Equation 2 presented in the analytical model
represents the market clearing condition

function C (Y , W ) , with respect to output, Y

1a

Total differentiation of C y gives us:
C yy dy  C yw dw  dP s

1b
s
s
dP s Y dY
s dP W dW
s dP

P

P
dY P s Y
dW P s W
Ps

2c
2d

1c

 P sY d ln Y   P sW d d ln W d  d ln P s

Sˆ ys

2e
)P sW d
d
ˆ
S
x

 P sW d is the inverse of the vector marginal
cost elasticitiy with respect to input
Ŝ ys the vector of the share of output Y in the
total revenue
Ŝ d are the vector share of input X in the
x
total cost

 XY = (

gives us the marginal cost.

Ps

dX Y dY
dX W dW
dX
X
X
dY X Y
dW X W
X
 XY d ln Y   XW d ln W  d ln X

2b

Elasticity of input with respect to output,
 XY , can be computed based on the
following property C wy = C yw and it implies:

where the derivative of cost

C (Y , W )
 Cy  Ps
Y

C wy dy  C ww dw  dX

III. Excess supply elasticity of input
mathematically depicted as

1d
i 

( it )  ( ir / S ir )
S ie

3a

Where  P sY is the vector of price elasticity

 i = the excess supply elasticity of input i

of outputs

 it =total market supply elasticity of input i

 P sW d is the vector marginal cost elasticitiy
with respect to input
II. Optimal factor demand can be obtained
using equation 3.

 ir =elasticity of demand of input i by the

rest of economy
S ie =market share of input i to ethanol
S ir =market share of input i to the rest of
the economy.
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Chapter 3: Soil Organic Carbon Sequestration in Corn Belt States:
A Meta Regression analysis
Abstract
This study investigated the extent to which statistical heterogeneity among results of multiple
studies on soil organic carbon (SOC) sequestration rate in response to conventional tillage (CT)
and no-till (NT) can be related to one or more characteristics of the studies. The analysis
employed a random effect meta-regression technique using the data obtained from recently
published experimental trials under continuous corn (CC) and corn soybean (CS) rotation system
from selected Corn Belt states.
Regarding the difference in the rate of SOC sequestration between NT and CT, our results shows
that the percentage of heterogeneity in the true treatment effect that is attributable to betweenstudy variability is 49%, whereas 51 % is attributable to within-study sampling variability.
We find that 26% of the between-study variance is explained by the explanatory variables
considered, and the remaining between-study variance appears almost zero. The regression
results support the argument that the difference between NT and CT decreases as measurement
depth increases. The results also show that the higher the initial SOC the higher the NT SOC
sequestration rate relative to the CT sequestration rate. A test for publication biases in the
analysis indicated no evidence for the presence of small-study effects.
Key words: SOC sequestration rate, no-till, conventional tillage, Meta regression
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3.1 Introduction
Results from many individual experimental studies across Midwest states and globally
showed considerable heterogeneity on the results of rate of SOC sequestration in response to NT
and CT practices. Given the range and variability of estimated sequestration rate, this study
combines the results of independent studies and doing regional assessments in order to uncover
the source of this heterogeneity.
Large areas of cropland in U.S. Corn Belt are being gradually converted from CT to
conservation tillage particularly to NT systems, and this change is partly driven by the fact that
widespread adoption of conservation tillage, specifically NT, would sequester a substantial
amount of SOC than CT (Christopher et.al 2009; Gal et.al 2007; Baker et.al 2007; Al-Kaisi and
Yin 2005; Lal et.al 1998; West and Post 2002; Blanco-Canqui & Lal, 2007). However, it is an
unsettled argument whether such practices actually sequester SOC. Higher SOC sequestration in
NT systems is reported in many studies when soil was sampled up to 30cm depth. However in a
few studies where sampling extended deeper than 30cm (Ga’l et.al 2007; Ogle et.al 2008) and in
experimental trials based on gas exchange measure ( Verma et.al 2005; Baker et al. 2007), NT
showed a higher or lower SOC sequestration.
Approximately 49% of agricultural SOC sequestration can be achieved by adopting
conservation tillage and residue management (Lal et al. 1998). However SOC loss consistently
increases with percentage residue harvest (Blanco-Canqui & Lal 2007). The partial or complete
removal of corn stover to produce biofuel reduces the amount of residue returned to the soil and
may increase the risk of soil degradation and eventually leads to depletion of the SOC pool and
greenhouse gases (GHG) emission of (Lal 2002 2004; Johnson et.al 2004 2007). SOC
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sequestration is a key component in the life cycle of biofuel production (Ney & Schnoor 2002;
Adler et al., 2007) and crucial in determining the GHG reduction potential of biofuels relative to
fossil fuels (Anderson-Teixeira et.al 2009). Various studies have quantified changes in SOC
under potential biofuel crops. Results are variable and have yet extensive effort is needed to
develop coherent pictures (Johnson et.al 2007; Wilhelm et.al 2007).
In the time of recent trend toward development of cellulosic biofuel production from crop
residues, it is crucial to put forward research findings related to SOC sequestration to understand
the relative advantage of conservation tillage over the CT. There is disparity among reported
experimental results on the relative advantage of NT over CT in SOC sequestration rate and yet
this is the information we should discern in such kind of study. Hence a regional assessment,
examining data from distinct cultivation systems could justify a broad understanding of NT and
CT effects on SOC in Corn Belt states. Therefore analyzing the results of different studies with
heterogeneous results across Corn Belt states using Meta regression analysis is essential to
elucidate the source of heterogeneity, particularly now when large areas of cropland are being
converted to long-term NT systems based on the premise that NT soils sequester SOC.
There have been several meta-analyses and scientific literature reviews on the effects of NT
and CT on SOC globally (West and Post 2002; Alvarez 2005; Angers and Eriksen-Hamel 2007;
Angers et al. 1997; Six et al 2002; Anderson-Teixeira et.al 2009) and also regionally in North
America (Christopher et.al 2007; Blanco-Canqui et.al 2007; Ogle et.al 2003).
The purpose of this study is therefore to conduct a Meta-regression analysis to investigate the
extent to which statistical heterogeneity among results of multiple studies on SOC sequestration
can be related to one or more characteristics of the studies. The analysis would help us to explore
study-to-study variation of SOC sequestration rate by determining the extent to which methods,
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design and data affect reported results. The analysis is based on recently peer reviewed
published studies on SOC sequestration from long-term paired experiments exclusively under
continuous corn (CC) and corn soybean (CS) rotation system . The data collected were from
multiyear paired experiments that ran at least for five years. To give fresh perspective and
augment the rapid development in approach of SOC measurements, only published studies since
year 2000 are included in our sample. In the study we also investigate publication and related
biases since most meta-analysis are susceptible to such problems.
The remainder of the paper is organized into four sections. Section 2 exposits the theoretical
model. This theoretical and analytical model is based on Meta regression and its estimation
procedure is using random effect model. Section 3 describes the data and material used in this
study. The empirical results of our application and implication of this study is presented in
section 4, and in the last section summary and concluding remarks are then provided. The
appendixes section contains results and figures from the regression analysis, and a tabular
summary of the data used in our meta-analyses.

3.2 Theoretical Model
Meta-analysis is widely applied in the medicine, economics and many other social
sciences fields (Thompson and Higgins 2002; Stanley and Jarrell 1998; Stanley 2001) and now
this technique is increasingly applied in physical science such as ecology and biology.
Particularly the application is gaining attention in the field of global change ecology (Manley
et.al 2005). The analysis is a quantitative method of combining the results of independent studies
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to investigate the extent to which statistical heterogeneity between results11 of multiple studies
that can be related to one or more characteristics of the studies (Fox 2009; Thompson and
Higgins 2002; Stanley 2001).

3.2.1 Meta-Regression Model
The model here is based on random effects with a generic form shown in equation 1. For
the subject i in the study j , we can write the basic underling model for outcome Yij

Yij   0   i X ij   j   ij

(1)

We assume that each study j provides total of n studies to estimate the effect of
interest, i , which here is a difference in rate of SOC sequestration from NT to CT. Each study
also reports a standard error for this estimate,  i , which we assume is known. Inference is based
on the assumption that the studies are a random sample of some hypothetical population of
studies.

 0 is an intercept of the regression model.

 is a k × 1 vector of regression coefficients to estimate, and X i is a 1 × k vector containing the
observed trial-level explanatory variables for study j . Explanatory variables used here are
initial SOC, depth of the soil sampled, yield of corn and soybean, mean annual temperature and
dummy for crop rotation (continuous corn verses corn-soybean rotation).

11

Heterogeneity is inevitable in meta-analysis since individual studies are never identical with
respect to study populations and other factors that can cause differences between studies (Van
Houwelingen et.al 2002).
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Our model allows for residual heterogeneity, assuming that the true effects follow a
normal distribution around the linear predictor:
Yi |  i ~ N ( i ,  i2 ) , where  i ~ N ( X i  , 2 )

(2)

 ij ~ N (0,  e 2 ) and  j ~ N (0, 2 )

(3)

 i is a true effect and has a normal distribution around the linear predictor, X i  . Here  ij is
within study error term whereas  j is between study error.  2 is between study variance and
should be estimated from the data12.
As shown on equation 4,  i , is determined by the true effect  i plus the within-study error  i .
In turn,  i , is determined by the mean of all true effects,  and the between-study error  i .
More generally, for any observed effect  i ,

 i   i   i    i   ij = X i  i   ij

(4)

There are two levels of sampling and two sources of error when we are dealing with
random effect model. At first, the true effect sizes  i are distributed about μ with a variance  2
that reflects the actual distribution of the true effects about their mean. Second, the observed
effect  i for any given  i will be distributed about that  i with a variance  2 that depends
primarily on the sample size for that study. Therefore, in assigning weights to estimate μ, we

12

In the random effects model, there is between-study as well as within-study components of the
variance term (Borenstein et.al 2007).
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need to deal with both sources of sampling error – within studies (  ij ), and between studies
(  j ). An excellent treatment of this approach can be found from (Borenstein et.al 2007; Harbord
and Higgins 2008)
As Harbord and Higgins (2008) presented in their analysis, all algorithms for randomeffects meta-regression first estimate the between-study variance,  2 , and then estimate the
coefficients,  , by weighted least squares by weighting using 1 /( i2   2 )

13

. The method used

to decompose the variance is to calculate the total variance and then to isolate the within-studies
variance. The variance between-studies (  2 ) is obtained as the difference between these two
values. The proportion of between-study variance explained by independent variables can be
calculated by comparing the estimated between-study variance, ˆ 2 , with its value when no
covariates are fit, ˆ o2 . Adjusted R 2 is the relative reduction in the between-study variance as
shown in equation 5.
2
Radj  (ˆo2  ˆ 2 ) / ˆo2

(5)

3.2.2 Mechanism to Investigate Publication Biases

In this section we provide the mechanism to investigate publication and small sample
bias using funnel plots and Egger test (Egger et al. 1997; Harbord and Harris 2009). If
publication bias exists, any meta-analysis based on it will be similarly biased (Sterne et.al 2000;
Palmer and Peters 2008). Funnel plot is a visual method used to test for the likely presence of
13

The default algorithm in our regression is residual (restricted) maximum likelihood (REML),
and directly maximizes the residual (restricted) log likelihood using Stata command (Harbord
and Higgins 2008).
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publication and related biases in meta-analysis14. Publication bias may lead to asymmetrical
funnel plots, however this bias is only one of a number of possible causes of funnel-plot
asymmetry (Sterne and Harbord 2004)15.Judgment based on such visual interpretation for
asymmetry is inherently subjective (Harbord and Harris 2009). Rather we used an Egger test
based on a linear regression approach to measure funnel plot asymmetry (Egger et al. 1997)
shown in equation 6 below.

effect i  1  1S.Ei   i

(6)

effect i in our case is the difference in ∆SOC sequestration rate of each study i , S.Ei is the

standard error of study j . We can test for H0: 1 =0, this simple meta-regression model is to
investigate whether a research literature is affected by publication selection (Egger et al. 1997;
Harbord and Harris 2009; Stanley and Doucouliagos 2011).

3.3 Material/Data Used in this Study
Based on the criteria we set, we found 13 peer-reviewed published studies that reported
rate of SOC sequestration in nine states (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, South
Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania and South Dakota). The total number observations are 78, see on
table 3.8.
14

Funnel plot is a simple scatter plots of the treatment effects (difference in rate of SOC
sequestration in our case ) estimated from individual studies against a measure of study size here
in our case a standard error of the effect size (Sterne et.al 2005; Palmer and Peters 2008;Sterne
and Egger 2001; Harbord and Harris 2009).
15
Egger et al. (1997) pointed out potential sources of asymmetry in funnel plots: Selection biases
(e.g. Publication bias), true heterogeneity (e.g. Size of effect differs according to study size),
Data irregularities (e.g. Poor methodological design of small studies, Inadequate analysis),
Heterogeneity due to poor choice of effect measure.
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Key data gatherer were soil depth, duration of tillage study, yield of corn and soybean16, types of
rotations, mean annual precipitation and temperature at experimental sites. In addition, the
standard error of the rate of SOC sequestration for each study was gathered. If these standard
errors were not reported, we estimated taking the mean of SOC sequestration rate and divide by
the number of replication of experimental plots. Furthermore, if specific details such as yield,
temperature and precipitation of the study were not reported, we estimated them based on the
county level information where the experiment was conducted.
Studies were included in the data set if the following criteria were met: (1) paired studies
that compared NT with CT exclusively under continuous corn and corn-soybean rotation system.
The tillage could be a multisystem with fertilizer treatment but with no residue treatment trials.
To be part of the analysis, each study must also report at least the rate of SOC sequestration and
initial or final SOC value. We dropped studies, if the specific paired tillage experimental studies
included crops other than corn and soybean in the CC and CS crop rotation. (2) SOC was
sampled to depths ≥15cm.17 (3) experiments that ran at least five years, since a multiyear
experimental study is necessary as there is difficulty to adequately detect a small change in SOC
stock over a time period of less than 5yr (Post et.al. 2001; Ellert et.al 2002; Baker et.al 2007;
personal communication with Varvel 2011). Almost all of the studies reviewed were from dry
land agriculture trails except four irrigated trials from Nebraska. Except 3 eddy covariance
studies , the majority of samples are based on the standard method for assessment of SOC
sequestration using soil sampling of long-term tillage research trial plots.
16

The yield for corn and soybean are the average yield during the experimental period. For those
studies that didn’t report yield during the experimental period, we used the average yield of the
county where the experimental trails ran.
17
The necessity of deeper depth sampling is for improved accuracy in the assessment of C or N
sequestration with no-till versus conventional tillage systems is vital (Ga’l et.al 2007).
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3.4 Empirical Results and Discussion
Table 3.1 and 3.2 portray the summary statistics of the data used in this study. The results
of the regression analysis are summarized from Tables 3.3 through 3.7. The summary statistics
indicate that the duration of the studies varied from 4 to 51 year, with an average of 16 years.
The average depth of the soil sampled under both tillage practices across all studies was 30 cm.
The dependent variable which is the difference in the rate of SOC from NT to CT has a mean
value of 0.09 Mg C ha-1yr-1.
The percentage of between-study heterogeneity that is attributable to variability in the
true treatment effect is 49%, whereas 51 % is attributable to within-study sampling variability.
Our regression results also show that 26% of the between-study variance is explained by the
explanatory variables considered, and the remaining between-study variance appears almost
zero, 0.003, depicted on table 3.3. We examined whether specific variables in the regression
analysis explain any of the heterogeneity of treatment effects between studies. The joint test for
all five independent variables gives a p-value of 0.009, indicating there is evidence for an
association of at least one or more of the explanatory variables with the size of the treatment
effect.
The positive coefficient on the initial SOC on table 3.3 indicates that the predicted rate of
SOC sequestration under NT relative CT increases. We can infer based on this result that on
average a plot under NT sequester 0.086 Mg C ha-1yr-1 more SOC than CT. The plotted figure
with fitted meta-regression line of the rate of ∆SOC against the initial SOC on Figure 3.2 shows
that at the low level of initial SOC the difference between these two tillage systems was smaller
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and close to zero, but as the initial SOC level is higher the NT system gains more rate
sequestration of SOC than the corresponding CT system.
Negative regression coefficients on the depth of soil measurement support the contention that the
relative no-till advantage over conventional tillage declined with deeper measurement depth.
Figure 3.4 also shows the clear relationship between depth and SOC sequestration rate. This
result conforms to the argument that SOC gain from NT that is based on shallow sample depth
disappears when deeper samples are included (Angers et al.1997; Dolan et al. 2006; Baker et.al
2007; Six et al. 2002; Gal et.al 2005; Vandenbygaart et al. 2002, 2003).
Our regression result on Table 3.3 and 3.5 also showed that for every bushel of corn
yield increase, keeping other factor constant , the rate of ∆SOC sequestration under NT system
increases 0.001 Mg C ha-1yr-1 higher SOC than CT. However for every bushel increase in a
soybean yield provides a 0.004 to 0.013 Mg C ha-1yr-1 fewer SOC sequestration rate to NT than
CT. Agronomically it is believed that the actual effect of the different tillage practices on soil C
storage is highly dependent on the types of crops produced in the field (Ga´l et.al 2007; Huggins
et.al 2007; Varvel 2006). In this regard corn has a greater biomass production than soybean and
combination of this quantity of biomass with NT practices may give an additional advantage for
corn to sequester more SOC than the CT.
The dummy variable rotation for coefficient measures the average difference in SOC
sequestration rate between CC and CS rotation given the same level of initial SOC, depth, corn
and soybean yield and temperature variables. After controlling the above explanatory variables,
NT system sequesters 0.05 Mg C ha-1yr-1 less SOC than CT when the rotation system is under
continuous corn than corn-soybean, shown on table 3.3. The above result seems odd from the
agronomic stand point under ideal condition. Various studies in Midwest showed that SOC
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sequestration under continuous corn has been normally higher than under corn–soybean rotation
(Lal et al. 1997; Paustian et al. 1997; Gal et.al 2007; Jagadamma et.al 2007; Jarecki and Lal
2003). It is also believed that differences in SOC sequestration between crop rotations is largely
influenced by the quantity of crop residues returned to the soil. However the differential in SOC
sequestration in our analysis may be due to rotation or other factors other than rotation that we
have not controlled for in the regression. Studies indicated that tillage effects on SOC storage
have been characterized either as a single factor or in combination with crop residue
management, N fertilization, or both (Huggins et.al. 2007 Havlin et al. 1990; Franzluebbers et al.
1994; Paustian et al. 1997).
It is informative to compare the intercept (our base variable in the dummy, CC) on the
equation to be estimated when all other explanatory variables are dropped from the equation.
The intercept on the result of this simple regression is the average difference that we can get for a
rate of ∆SOC when the rotation is under continuous corn system. From table 3.4 result therefore,
plots under CC would provide 0.0161 Mg C ha-1yr-1 fewer rate of ∆SOC to NT than CT. The
coefficient on this dummy is the difference in the average a rate of ∆SOC of CC relative to CS.
The above results offer comparison of-means-test between CC and CS rotation system. The
estimated difference between CC to CS is 0.037 Mg C ha-1yr-1. However this difference is not
statistically significant as shown on table 3.4.
Among other factors, the differential effects of rotation on SOC sequestration rate in both
tillage systems may vary by the depth of the soil. Clap et.al (2000) argued that very little crop
residue was mechanically buried below 15 cm in the NT treatment unless moved by earthworm
activity. Fourteen years of experiment on tillage and rotation interaction, (Huggins et.al 2005),
indicated that significant contributions to greater SOC under CC for Chisel Plough and NT, as
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compared with Mold board Plough, occurred from C storage below tillage operating depths (30to 45-cm). To put the above arguments in perspective, we added an interaction variable of the
dummy rotation with depth-this actually would allow us to have different slope and give more
exposition on the relationship among tillage practices, crop rotation and depth. Using our new
interaction variable, we then tested whether the effect of continuous corn and corn-soybean
rotation over rate of ∆SOC is the same at all depth of the soil.
We are now testing the hypothesis that the average difference in rate of SOC
sequestration between NT and CT are identical for CC and CS rotation that have similar depth of
soil measurement. Under the null hypothesis the coefficient over the dummy and interaction term
must both be zero. Our F test value gave us F (2, 70) = 3.14 and Prob > F=0.0495. Therefore we
rejected the above hypothesis, implying that there would be variation in SOC sequestration
between CC and CS at the same depth of soil. Another important hypothesis we test is that the
difference in rate of SOC sequestration (from NT to CT) is the same for CC and CS rotation
system across all depth of soil. Our test F (1, 70) = 3.19, Prob > F = 0.0470. We then accepted
the hypothesis that the difference in ∆SOC sequestration rate is similar across all depth.
Another important factor that can influence the relative impacts of tillage practices on
SOC sequestration rate is the temperature. The regression results both on Table 3.3 and 3.5 and
Figure 3.5 shows the effects of average regional temperature variation on SOC sequestration
over the difference between NT to CT had a significant correlation between temperature variable
and differential SOC sequestration rates. The regression results reveal that a one degree Celsius
increase in temperature would reduce the sequestration of NT to CT by -0.0612 (table 3.3).
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Publication Bias and Model Validation
The diagonal lines on figure 3.5 are representing the 95% confidence limits around the
summary treatment effect. As shown on the figure 3.5, the 95% of the studies lied within the
funnel defined by these straight lines and the plot resembled a symmetrical, inverted funnel. This
may suggest the absence of publication bias. To avoid subjective judgment we performed a test
of small-study effects based on equation 6. The estimated bias coefficient shown on Table 3.7 is
-0.202 with a standard error of 0.295, giving a p-value of 0.496. The test thus provides no
evidence for the presence of small-study effects. Figure 3.6 also asserted the absence of this bias.
Finally we launched a model validation and check for outliers and influential studies based on
the statistics available from prediction18. Figure 3.7 suggests that the assumption of normal
random effects is sufficient, and there are no notable outliers because the largest standardized
shrunken residual is only slightly over 2.

18

This probability plot can be used to check the assumption of normality of the random effects,
although because this assumption has been used in generating the predictions, only gross
deviations are likely to be detected.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this study we used meta-regression model to explore the sources of study-to-study
variation on the reported results of SOC sequestration rate due to NT and CT in selected Corn
Belt states.
Our analysis underscores that nearly half of the variation on the results of reported rate of SOC
sequestration between published studies is due to variability in the true treatment effect while the
remaining half is as a result of within study sampling variation. Our regression result also
showed a quarter of between-study variance is explained by the explanatory variables
considered, and the remaining within-study variance appears very small.
Although most of the coefficient of explanatory variables in the regression results
exhibited expected sign from agronomic stand point, some of the coefficients were not
significant. An important point we can infer based on our analysis is that the rate of SOC
sequestration differences between NT and CT disappears as measurement depth increases. On
average No-Till system sequesters more SOC than conventional tillage for every bushel of corn
yield increases however the opposite was true for the case of soybean yield. The observed gain
in SOC sequestration rate of CT over NT when the crop rotation system was under continuous
corn contrast with previous results and agronomic practices in Corn Belt states, this may be
attributed to several factors other than variables which we cannot fully observed and controlled
in our study.
In the analysis we only showed the absence of publication bias or small study effect via
funnel plot and a test for funnel plot asymmetry. One should note that these tests do not offer a
solution to the bias problems if any exist rather alert us the potential presence of the problem.
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Therefore correcting for publication bias will make an important practical ways to provide better
understanding on Meta-analysis results.
Overall the combined results clearly showed that there is considerable variation in the
rate of SOC sequestration in response to NT and CT across the study states. In addition to the
tillage management, the presence of having heterogeneous biophysical characteristics such as
yield, initial SOC, temperature and other explanatory variables we listed, difference trial design
and quality as well as publication selection bias are responsible for heterogeneity in reported
differences in SOC sequestration rate.
Our analysis is subject to several limitations such as the assumption we made on standard error,
and other explanatory variables, as a result estimated coefficients and results should be
interpreted with caution.
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I. Tables of Result
Table 3.1 Summary statistics for the variables under this study
Variable
Mean Std. Dev. Min
19
Rate of ∆SOC, Mg C ha-1 yr-1
0.088
0.47
-1.13
-1
Initial SOC, Mg C ha
54
29
21
Duration, year
16
15
4
Depth, cm
30
18
15
Corn yield, bu ha-1 yr-1
132
47
66
-1
-1
Soybean yield, bu ha yr
40
15
24
Temperature, OC
9.4
1.7
6.2
Rain fall, mm/annum
837
126
580
Note: total observations=78

Max
2.4
159
51
75
245
92
11.1
1112

Table 3.2 Rate of ∆SOC sequestration by depth of soil measured
Depth,
Rate of ∆soc,
Depth frequency
cm
Mg C ha-1 yr-1
(%)
47.4
15
-0.03
20
-0.08
2.6
30
0.16
23.1
45
0.51
5.1
46
0.05
5.1
60
0.28
14.1
75
-0.04
2.6
Note: 63% of the observations are under Corn-soybean rotation while the remaining 37% is
Continuous corn

19

The dependent variable is the difference in SOC sequestration rate from NT to CT.
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Table 3.3 Joint Meta-regression results: the dependent variable is rate of ∆SOC, Mg C/ha/yr
REML estimate of between-study variance
tau2=0.003
% residual variation due to heterogeneity
I2-res 49.43%
Proportion of between-study variance explained
Adj R2= 25.83%
Joint test for all covariates
Model F(6,71)= 3.14
With Knapp-Hartung modification
Prob > F= 0.0087
Explanatory variables
Coeff.
At mean
Initial SOC
0.0016*
0.086
(2.12)
Depth
-0.0014
-0.042
(-0.98)
Corn yield
0.0008
0.106
(1.64)
Soybean yield
-0.013*
-0.520
(-2.13)
temperature
-0.057*
0.536
(-2.34)
Continuous corn rotation
-0.0495
(-1.05)
_cons
0.860**
(2.81)
t statistics in parentheses;* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; The F-table distribution at 95% is
F(6,71)=2.23
Note the mean is calculated based on the mean observed values for each variable shown on table
3.1.

Table 3.4 Independent regression results for continuous corn and corn-soybean rotation
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
P>t
continuous corn rotation
0.0367
0.0311
1.18
0.241
_cons
-0.0161
0.0251
-0.64
0.523
Adj R-squared =2.07%; I2 residual = 80.27%
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Table 3.5 Joint regression results: the dependent variable is rate of ∆soc, Mg C/ha/yr
REML estimate of between-study variance
tau2= 002
% residual variation due to heterogeneity
I2-res= 52.74%
Proportion of between-study variance explained
Adj-R2= 45.9%
Joint test for all covariates
Model F(7,70)= 3.80
With Knapp-Hartung modification
Prob > F= 0.0015
Explanatory variables
Coeff.
At mean
Initial SOC
0.0042**
0.227
(3.23)
Depth
-0.0013
-0.039
(-0.98)
Corn yield
0.0008
0.106
(1.71)
Soybean yield
-0.0042
-0.168
(-1.73)
temperature
-0.0612*
-0.575
(-2.53)
continuous corn
0.115
rotation
(1.32)
depth*cont
-0.0064*
(-2.22)
_cons
0.675*
(2.15)
t-statistics in parentheses;* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. The F-table distribution
F(7,70)=2.14
Note the mean is calculated based on the mean observed values for each variable shown on table
3.1.
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Table 3.6 Joint Meta-regression results: the dependent variable percentage change in SOC
REML estimate of between-study variance
tau2=35.8
% residual variation due to heterogeneity
I2-res 99.98%
Proportion of between-study variance explained
Adj R2= 31.02%
Joint test for all covariates
Model F(6,71)= 6.66
With Knapp-Hartung modification
Prob > F= 0.0000
Explanatory variables
Coeff.
Initial SOC
0.0614*
(2.00)
Depth
-0.164**
(-3.10)
Corn yield
0.0219
(1.37)
Soybean yield
0.0429
(0.87)
temperature

1.548**
(3.08)
Continuous corn rotation
-3.578*
(-2.22)
_cons
-24.86***
(-4.32)
t statistics in parentheses;* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. The F-table distribution at 95% is
F(6,71)=2.23

Table 3.7 Egger's test for small-study effects: Regress standard normal deviate of intervention
effect estimate against its standard error
Std_Eff
Coef.
Std. Err
t
P>t
Slope
-0.054
0.012
4.43
0.000
Bias
-0.202
0.295
-0.68
0.496
Test of H0: no small-study effects, P = 0.496
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Figure 3.1Boxplot depicting change in SOC against the depth of soil (cm) with 15cm interval
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Fitted meta-regression line of differences in SOC against intial SOC
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Figure 3.2 “Bubble” plots20 of Meta regression line of the ∆SOC (NT-CT) against the initial
SOC level

20

A “bubble plot” is to a graph that a fitted regression line together with circles representing the
estimates from each study, sized according to the precision of each estimate (the inverse of its
within-study variance,  i2 ). The area of each circle is inversely proportional to the variance of
the difference in ∆SOC sequestration rate estimate.
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Figure 3.3 “Bubble” plots of Meta regression line of the ∆SOC (NT-CT) against the depth of
SOC measured
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Figure 3.4 “Bubble plot” with fitted meta-regression line ∆SOC against average temperature of
the experimental sites.
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Funnel plot with pseudo 95% confidence limits
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Figure 3.5 Funnel plot, using SOC sequestration rate against their standard error21

21

The diagonal lines representing the 95% confidence limits around the summary treatment
effect, i.e., [summary effect estimate ± (1.96 × standard error)] for each standard error on the
vertical axis. This shows the expected distribution of studies in the absence of selection biasesy,
95% of the studies should lie within the funnel defined by these straight lines. Because these
lines are not strict 95% limits, they are referred to as “pseudo 95% confidence limits” (Sterne
and Harbord, 2004).Results from small studies will therefore scatter widely at the bottom of the
graph, with the spread narrowing among larger studies. In the absence of bias, the plot will
resemble a symmetrical, inverted funnel.
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Figure 3.6 Publication biases estimated using Egger test
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Appendix 3
Table 8 Summary of the data from published studies used in a meta-regression analysis of SOC
sequestration under no-till (NT) and conventional tillage (CT)
Rate of ∆soc, Initial SOC, Duration,
Soil depth,
Author
Mg C ha-1 yr-1
Mg C ha-1
Year
cm
State
-0.20
70.6
Venterea et.al (2006)
5
20
MN
1.00
62.8
Venterea et.al (2006)
5
20
MN
-2.10
101.8
Venterea et.al (2006)
5
30
MN
-1.60
92.2
Venterea et.al (2006)
5
30
MN
-2.50
135.0
Venterea et.al (2006)
5
45
MN
-8.10
119.5
Venterea et.al (2006)
5
45
MN
-2.70
158.6
Venterea et.al (2006)
5
60
MN
-12.0
139.2
Venterea et.al (2006)
5
60
MN
0.24
29.8
Olson et.al (2005)
12
15
IL
0.45
28.6
Olson et.al (2005)
12
15
IL
0.22
43.0
Olson et.al (2005)
12
30
IL
0.45
46.0
Olson et.al (2005)
12
30
IL
0.32
47.8
Olson et.al (2005)
12
45
IL
0.42
46.0
Olson et.al (2005)
12
45
IL
0.37
49.5
Olson et.al (2005)
12
60
IL
0.46
52.3
Olson et.al (2005)
12
60
IL
0.32
53.3
Olson et.al (2005)
12
75
IL
0.56
51.4
Olson et.al (2005)
12
75
IL
0.39
44.9
Jareckia et.al (2004)
13
30
OH
0.38
54.4
Jareckia et.al (2004)
14
30
OH
0.00
44.8
Ussiri & Lal (2008)
43
30
OH
2.00
45.3
Ussiri & Lal (2008)
43
30
OH
0.0001
20.8
Ussiri & Lal (2008)
43
15
OH
-0.002
21.9
Ussiri & Lal (2008)
43
15
OH
-0.70
34.7
Khan et.al (2007)
51
15
IL
2.20
34.7
Khan et.al (2007)
51
15
IL
-0.30
42.0
Khan et.al (2007)
51
15
IL
0.40
37.1
Khan et.al (2007)
51
15
IL
3.70
94.3
Khan et.al (2007)
51
46
IL
-0.30
94.3
Khan et.al (2007)
51
46
IL
-10.70
119.6
Khan et.al (2007)
51
46
IL
-2.43
102.7
Khan et.al (2007)
51
46
IL
-1.13
37.9
Verma et.al (2005)
4
15
NE
-0.51
68.8
Verma et.al (2005)
4
30
NE
-0.80
34.8
Verma et.al (2005)
4
15
NE
-0.04
62.9
Verma et.al (2005)
4
30
NE
-1.30
34.6
Verma et.al (2005)
4
15
NE
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Verma et.al (2005)
Moorman et.al (2004)
Moorman et.al (2004)
Al-Kaisi et.al (2005)
Al-Kaisi et.al (2005)
Al-Kaisi et.al (2005)
Al-Kaisi et.al (2005)
Al-Kaisi et.al (2005)
Al-Kaisi et.al (2005)
Blanco-Canqui & Lal (2007)
Blanco-Canqui & Lal (2007)
Blanco-Canqui & Lal (2007)
Blanco-Canqui & Lal (2007)
Blanco-Canqui & Lal (2007)
Blanco-Canqui & Lal (2007)
Blanco-Canqui & Lal (2007)
Varvel (2006)
Varvel (2006)
Varvel (2006)
Varvel (2006)
Varvel (2006)
Varvel (2006)
Varvel (2006)
Varvel (2006)
Varvel (2006)
Varvel (2006)
Varvel (2006)
Varvel (2006)
Russell et.al (2005)
Russell et.al (2005)
Russell et.al (2005)
Russell et.al (2005)
Russell et.al (2005)
Russell et.al (2005)
Pikul et.al (2008)
Pikul et.al (2008)
Pikul et.al (2008)
Pikul et.al (2008)
Pikul et.al (2008)
Pikul et.al (2008)
Jagadamma et.al (2007)

-0.40
-3.40
-7.00
7.90
1.80
6.90
2.00
6.90
7.70
-4.76
-6.63
3.34
4.94
-2.65
1.98
1.62
-5.60
-4.30
-3.10
-3.50
-3.00
-2.20
-2.90
-2.30
-1.70
-1.80
-1.40
-0.80
-1.47
-1.23
-0.47
2.40
4.05
5.10
-2.30
-1.77
-5.86
-2.54
-2.92
-3.94
4.48

64.0
28.1
48.4
44.6
35.7
38.0
30.3
38.9
43.5
55.3
39.1
34.4
40.9
43.5
54.7
43.0
52.7
53.8
54.7
57.5
55.8
56.0
29.4
30.5
31.2
30.7
30.2
30.2
32.8
35.1
38.4
96.7
85.5
79.9
32.0
31.4
28.0
32.9
34.3
33.8
71.2

4
12
12
7
7
7
7
7
7
15
12
30
10
8
20
5
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
12
12
12
12
12
12
11
11
11
11
11
11
23

30
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
30
30
30
30
30
30
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
30

NE
IA
IA
IA
IA
IA
IA
IA
IA
OH
OH
OH
PA
PA
PA
PA
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
IA
IA
IA
IA
IA
IA
ND
ND
ND
ND
ND
ND
IL

